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SUBVERTING CONGRESS’ INTENT: THE 
RECENT MISAPPLICATION OF SECTION 10 
OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND 
ITS CONSEQUENT IMPACTS ON SENSITIVE 
WILDLIFE AND HABITAT 
WILLIAM S. EUBANKS II* 
Abstract: Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act, or the ESA, strictly prohibits 
any person or other entity from “taking” any endangered or threatened species, 
whether purposefully or incidentally. In section 10 of the ESA, Congress created 
two distinct permit mechanisms to allow the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, or 
FWS, to authorize take in certain limited circumstances—namely recovery per-
mits for purely scientific research and incidental take permits, or ITPs, for non-
scientific endeavors where such taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, an 
otherwise lawful activity. Because scientific research benefitting the species at is-
sue is not a primary objective of the second type of permit, Congress created a 
carefully calibrated permitting regime for ITPs. These permits provide certain 
safeguards that ensure extensive public comment opportunities and environmen-
tal review under the National Environmental Policy Act—safeguards that, natu-
rally, are less extensive for scientific permits. In recent years, however, the FWS 
has, in various instances, conflated the distinct purposes of these two statutory 
permitting schemes. The agency has issued recovery permits to entities seeking 
authorization for incidental takes rather than scientific research, which has result-
ed in the issuance of permits to developers with far less public scrutiny and re-
view than Congress intended. This Article analyzes the applicable legislative his-
tory and statutory text, assesses recent examples of the conflation of these two 
distinct permitting schemes, and examines the public policy rationales against the 
agency’s continued short-circuiting of congressional safeguards through the issu-
ance of recovery permits for incidental takes that are not tantamount to pure sci-
entific research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As our nation’s preeminent wildlife conservation and habitat protection 
law, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or the “Act”)1 “represent[s] the most 
comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever en-
acted by any nation.”2 The law carries out this ambitious agenda through its 
many substantive requirements imposed on Federal, State, and private enti-
ties.3 These obligations seek to minimize harm to ESA-protected species and 
their habitats, as well as to mitigate any unavoidable harm that may occur de-
spite all reasonable minimization efforts.4 
Most notable of these obligations is the ESA’s “take” prohibition—found 
in section 9 of the Act. Section 9 is a strict liability provision that Congress 
enacted to bolster species survival and recovery by preventing all forms of le-
thal and non-lethal “take” of ESA-protected species.5 Congress has created 
only a few limited exceptions to the take prohibition. In the original ESA en-
acted in 1973, Congress created the section 7 interagency process, through 
which federal projects that were found not to jeopardize the continued exist-
ence of a listed species were authorized by the consulting agency, effectively 
providing the action agency with an authorization for incidental take.6 The 
original Act also created the section 10 scientific recovery permit (“SRP”) pro-
cess to support scientific research efforts aimed at species survival and recov-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012). 
 2 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). 
 3 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2), (b)(4)(C)(ii), 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii). 
 4 See id. §§ 1536(a)(2), (b)(4)(C)(ii) (requiring, through inter-agency consultation, “reasonable 
and prudent measures that the Secretary [of Interior] considers necessary or appropriate to minimize 
such impact”), 1539(a)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring in the incidental take permit process that, “the applicant 
. . . submit . . . to the Secretary a conservation plan that specifies . . . what steps the applicant will take 
to minimize and mitigate such impacts, and the funding that will be available to implement such 
steps”). 
 5 See id. §§ 1531(b) (noting that the purpose of the Act is to provide a means for the conservation 
of endangered and threatened species and the ecosystems on which they depend), 1532(19) (defining 
“take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 
engage in any such conduct”), 1538(a)(1)(B) (explaining that, “it is unlawful for any person subject to 
the jurisdiction of the United States to . . . take any such species within the United States or the territo-
rial sea of the United States”). 
 6 See Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884, 892 (1973) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536 
(2012)). Under the interagency consultation process, the FWS conducted a biological assessment to 
determine whether the proposed federal project would jeopardize the continued existence of a listed 
species. See id. Upon a conclusion by the consulting agency that the action would not jeopardize the 
species, the action agency could go forward with the project subject to the terms and conditions im-
posed by the consulting agency. Congress memorialized this practice of allowing non-jeopardizing 
incidental take by federal agencies, by codifying the requirement of an “incidental take statement” in 
the 1978 Amendments that remains in effect today. See Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752–53 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)–(c). 
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ery.7 In its 1982 ESA amendments, Congress established a new process where-
by non-federal actors seeking to conduct otherwise lawful activities that would 
result in harm to ESA-listed species could obtain a different type of section 10 
permit—called an “incidental take permit” or “ITP”—to allow these private 
activities to proceed subject to certain conditions (not unlike those applying to 
federal agencies in the section 7 process8).9 
The agencies responsible for administering the ESA, through delegation 
from their parent agencies, are the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”).10 For several decades, the 
FWS and NMFS administered the two distinct section 10 permitting pro-
grams—SRPs and ITPs—consistent with the carefully calibrated approach that 
Congress built into that provision of the ESA.11 This implementation included: 
(1) considering for SRPs only pure scientific research activities 
while relegating private activities for other purposes to the ITP 
process; 
(2) requiring more rigorous conditions for issuance of ITPs than for 
SRPs because of their fundamental differences; and 
(3) providing extensive public participation opportunities with re-
spect to ITP applications, which is not always necessary for SRPs 
because of their very different purposes and covered activities.12 
In recent years, however, the FWS has abruptly changed course and has, in 
various instances, conflated the distinct purposes behind these two statutory 
                                                                                                                           
 7 87 Stat. at 896 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A) (2012)). 
 8 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (providing that the Secretary may issue an incidental take permit 
when the impact, steps to mitigate impacts, alternative actions, and other necessary or appropriate 
measures for the otherwise lawful activity have been considered), with 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(4) 
(providing that the Secretary may permit the agency action when, upon consultation with affected 
States and the agency, he has concluded that the incidental take is not likely to jeopardize the endan-
gered or threatened species or result in destruction or adverse modification of their habitats). 
 9 Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 92-304, 96 Stat. 1411, 1422 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)). 
 10 Andrew A. Smith et al., The Endangered Species Act at Twenty: An Analytical Survey of Fed-
eral Endangered Species Protection, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1027, 1036 (1993); Laws & Regulations: 
Summary of the Endangered Species Act, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-
regulations/summary-endangered-species-act (last updated Nov. 12, 2014), archived at http://perma.
cc/4BCS-BNDW. 
 11 See 50 C.F.R. §§ 222.307–.308 (2015) (providing the procedures for the incidental take permit 
program and procedures for the scientific recovery permit program); Endangered and Threatened 
Species; Regulations Consolidation, 64 Fed. Reg. 14,052, 14,052 (Mar. 23, 1999) (codified at 15 
C.F.R. pt. 902, 50 C.F.R. pts. 217, 220–227, 648, 679, 697) (introducing the two distinct programs). 
 12 Compare 50 C.F.R. § 222.307 (providing the permit process for incidental taking of species), 
with id. § 222.308 (providing the permit process for scientific purposes). 
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permitting schemes.13 In the process, the FWS has issued recovery permits to 
entities seeking authorization for incidental take rather than purely scientific 
research, which has resulted in permits being issued to developers with far less 
public scrutiny and participation than would otherwise be the case.14 
This Article provides an analysis of the applicable legislative history, 
statutory text, and past implementation of the ESA,15 assesses recent examples 
of the FWS’s conflation of these two distinct permitting schemes,16 and exam-
ines the public policy rationales against the agency continuing to short-circuit 
congressional safeguards when considering issuance of SRPs for activities that 
would be unlawful under the ESA without an ITP.17 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ESA: STATUTORY TEXT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
AND FLASHPOINT CASES 
The ESA is a complex, technical statute that has been the subject of vari-
ous detailed treatises.18 This Part distills the fundamentals of pertinent ESA 
provisions by focusing on the ESA’s text and germane portions of the legisla-
tive history that help shed light on Congress’ reasons for including certain pro-
visions in the Act. 
A. The 1973 Act 
Long characterized as “the pit bull of federal environmental statutes,”19 
the ESA is the result of Congress’ determination in 1973 that at-risk wildlife 
and plant species, as well as the habitat they require for survival and recovery, 
needed legislative safeguards to curb the effects of human development.20 Un-
derlying Congress’ passage of the ESA was its finding that, “these species of 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See infra notes 172–253 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 172–253 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 18–171 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 172–253 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 254–269 and accompanying text. 
 18 William S. Eubanks II, Chapter 11: Agriculture and the Endangered Species Act, in FOOD, 
AGRICULTURE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 185 (Mary Jane Angelo et al. eds., 2014) (citing ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, AND PERSPECTIVES (Donald C. Baur & W. Robert Irvin eds., 
2010)). See generally ENDANGERED SPECIES DESKBOOK (Lawrence Liebesman & Rafe Petersen eds., 
2010) (treatise discussing the ESA). 
 19 Robert D. Thornton, Searching for Consensus and Predictability: Habitat Conservation Plan-
ning Under the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 21 ENVTL. L. 605, 605 (1991) (quoting an address 
delivered on April 6, 1990, by Donald Barry, Majority Counsel, House of Representatives Committee 
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries). 
 20 “[V]arious species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United States have been rendered extinct 
as a consequence of economic growth and development untempered by adequate concern and conser-
vation.” 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2012) (providing congressional findings serving as the basis for the 
ESA). 
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fish, wildlife, and plants are of esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, rec-
reational, and scientific value to the Nation and its people.”21 
The U.S. Supreme Court reinforced this point in 1978, several years after 
the ESA’s enactment, in TVA v. Hill, holding that, “the plain language of the 
Act, buttressed by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed 
the value of endangered species as ‘incalculable.’”22 Because, as a matter of 
logic, the “incalculable” value of these species cannot be outweighed by any 
economic value (or loss thereof), Congress elevates species protection above 
private development wherever an irreconcilable conflict arises.23 Noting this 
salient fact, the Supreme Court explained that, “Congress has spoken in the 
plainest of words, making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck 
in favor of affording endangered species the highest of priorities, thereby 
adopting a policy which it described as ‘institutionalized caution.’”24 This pol-
icy has the express purpose of “halt[ing] and revers[ing] the trend toward spe-
cies extinction, whatever the cost.”25 
In order to provide the critical support necessary to stave off extinction 
and promote recovery for these at-risk species that were viewed as having “in-
calculable” value, Congress created various procedures under the ESA de-
signed to bring science to bear on all actions anticipated to adversely affect 
ESA-protected species.26 It also built into the Act prohibitions against harming 
listed species and mechanisms for enforcing these restrictions.27 Thus, Con-
gress crafted in the ESA a holistic statutory scheme in which all provisions aim 
to both independently and cumulatively further the policy of institutionalized 
caution to protect species and habitats, as that policy was “reflected not only in 
the stated policies of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute.”28 
Congress referred to this overall program in the statute, explaining that the 
“purposes” of the Act “are to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Id. § 1531(a)(3). 
 22 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 (1978). 
 23 See id. (reasoning that, because the species must be viewed as having “incalculable” value, the 
ESA does not permit courts to make utilitarian calculations by placing economic value on a species or 
the public burden of preserving that species). 
 24 Id. at 194. 
 25 Id. at 184, 194 (emphasis added). 
 26 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012) (requiring agencies to consider the best scientific data avail-
able in determining when an action is likely to jeopardize a species); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184–85 
(explaining that specific provisions of the ESA reflect Congress’ policy goal of preventing extinction). 
 27 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19) (defining “take” to include to “harm”), 1536(a)(2), 1538(a)(1)(B) 
(prohibiting a “take” of any listed species). 
 28 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184, 194. 
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[and] to provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species 
and threatened species.”29 
To administer this program of species and habitat conservation,30 Con-
gress tasked the Interior Department and the Commerce Department with the 
primary responsibility for implementing the ESA,31 which those agencies del-
egated to the FWS and NMFS, respectively.32 Congress specified that the spe-
cies subject to the Act’s jurisdiction are those deemed by the FWS or NMFS as 
rising to the level of “endangered”—i.e., “any species which is in danger of 
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range”33—or those spe-
cies rising to the level of “threatened”—i.e., “any species which is likely to 
become an endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a 
significant portion of its range.”34 To determine which species satisfy the 
threshold for “endangered” or “threatened,” Congress provided a detailed pro-
cess in section 4 of the Act, under which the FWS or NMFS analyzes each 
species under review by assessing five key threats that may be impeding the 
species’ survival and/or recovery prospects.35 These factors include the “de-
struction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range[;] overutilization 
for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes[;] disease or 
predation[;] the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms[;] and other 
natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.”36 Absent very 
limited circumstances, if the FWS or NMFS determines that a species meets 
the statutory criteria for an “endangered” or “threatened” species, that species 
is added to the list of endangered and threatened species and is immediately 
afforded the full protections of the Act.37 
                                                                                                                           
 29 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). 
 30 Id. § 1532(3) (defining “conserve,” “conserving,” and “conservation” to mean “to use and the 
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened 
species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to th[e] [ESA] are no longer necessary”); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDAN-
GERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, at 427–28 (1982) (defining “conserve,” “conserving,” and “conserva-
tion” in the bill that would become the ESA). 
 31 16 U.S.C. § 1532(15); Smith et al., supra note 10, at 1036. 
 32 Smith et al., supra note 10, at 1036. 
 33 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6)(2012) (defining “endangered species”), 1538(a)(1) (prohibiting certain 
acts with respect to endangered species); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 3 (defining “endangered 
species”). 
 34 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(20) (defining “threatened species”),1538(a)(1)(G) (prohibiting the violation 
of any regulation with respect to threatened species); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-740 (defining “threat-
ened species”). 
 35 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1). 
 36 Id. 
 37 As enacted by Congress in the 1973 ESA (and as is the case today), the only limited circum-
stances where listed wildlife species are not afforded the full protections of the Act are when the FWS 
or NMFS determines that, “regulations” are “necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation” 
 
2015] The Misapplication of ESA § 10 and Its Impact on Habitat and Wildlife 265 
In enacting the ESA, Congress viewed those substantive and procedural 
protections as crucial for putting endangered and threatened species on the 
path to recovery.38 Perhaps the most pivotal provision for species conserva-
tion—and consequently the most unforgiving—is the section 9 strict prohibi-
tion on the unauthorized “take” by any “person” of any member of any ESA-
listed species.39 In that provision, Congress made clear in defining “Prohibited 
Acts” that, 
Except as provided in sections [6 and 10] of this title, with respect to 
any endangered species of fish or wildlife listed pursuant to section 
[4] of this title[,] it is unlawful for any person subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States to . . . take any such species within the 
United States or the territorial sea of the United States.40 
The statute further delineates the broad contours of the take prohibition by de-
fining “person[s]” subject to the Act’s provisions as any “individual, corpora-
tion, partnership, trust, association, or any other private entity; or any officer, 
employee, agent, department, or instrumentality of the Federal Government, of 
any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State, or of any foreign 
government.”41 The spectrum of activities covered by the take prohibition is 
equally broad. The ESA defines the term “take” as “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, 
                                                                                                                           
of a threatened species—a provision with no force as to endangered wildlife species. See id. § 1533(c) 
(providing that the Secretary must publish the list of species that he has determined to be threatened), 
1533(d)(providing that when a species has been listed as threatened the Secretary promulgates regula-
tions according to what he deems “necessary and advisable to provide for the conservation of such 
species”). Moreover, listed plant species receive lesser protections than listed wildlife species, as 
listed plants are “not subject to the take prohibition in [section 9 of the ESA], but instead are subject 
to less stringent prohibitions on the import, transport, or sale of endangered or threatened plant species 
and on removal of listed plants from federal lands.” Eubanks, supra note 18, at 187 & n.33; see also 
Sandra B. Zellmer & Scott A. Johnson, Biodiversity in McElligot’s Pool, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 481 
(2002) (explaining, as a shortcoming of the ESA, the fact that, “the statute fails to protect plant species 
on private lands”); Holly Wheeler, Chapter 12: Plants, in ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: LAW, POLICY, 
AND PERSPECTIVES 247, 249–51 (Donald C. Baur & W. Robert Irvin, eds., 2d ed. 2010). 
 38 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184–85 (1978) (explaining that the prohibitions 
and requirements Congress included in every part of the ESA show Congress’ intent to prevent spe-
cies extinction). 
 39 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2012) (emphases added). 
 40 Id. (emphases added). 
 41 Id. §§ 1532(13) (defining “person”), 1538(a)(1) (providing that the “take” prohibition applies 
to any person); see also Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155, 163–66 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding a state agency 
liable under section 9 of the ESA for promulgating and administering a regulatory licensing scheme 
that serves as a proximate cause of takes of endangered right whales); H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 3 
(1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, supra 
note 30, at 428. 
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shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such 
conduct,” with respect to an ESA-listed species.42 
In the ESA, Congress initially created only two very limited exceptions to 
the take prohibition. The first mechanism for permitting an otherwise unlawful 
take is found in section 7, in which Congress provided that federal agencies 
undertaking, funding, or authorizing an activity that may result in take of listed 
species must first “consult” with the FWS or NMFS to determine the extent of 
the activity’s effect on listed species or habitat.43 Specifically, section 7 re-
quires that each federal agency “tak[e] such action necessary to insure that ac-
tions authorized, funded, or carried out by them is not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of such endangered species and threatened species or re-
sult in the destruction or modification of [critical] habitat of such species.”44 
To satisfy this “jeopardy” mandate, the agency seeking to proceed with—or 
authorize or fund—a project that is expected to take a listed species (the “ac-
tion agency”), must engage with the FWS or NMFS (the “consulting agency”) 
in “formal consultation” to determine the anticipated effects of the action on 
listed species to confirm that the action will not result in jeopardy.45 
At the conclusion of the consultation process, assuming the agency activi-
ty can be undertaken in such a manner as to avoid species jeopardy, the FWS 
or NMFS issues a biological opinion authorizing the action agency to proceed, 
subject to any terms and conditions imposed by the consulting agency to min-
                                                                                                                           
 42 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 4 (defining the term “take” in the bill 
that would become the ESA). The FWS has further defined the “harm” and “harass” forms of take via 
formal regulations, defining the former as “an act which actually kills or injures wildlife[,] . . . . 
[which] may include significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures 
wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding[,] or 
sheltering,” and the latter as “an intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood 
of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral 
patterns which include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.” 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 
(2015). 
 43 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (requiring federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to 
ensure that agency actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered species or their habitats, and 
providing the terms for granting exemptions from the ESA); H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 10. 
 44 H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 10. Although Congress has not defined “jeopardize” as used in sec-
tion 7, the FWS and NMFS have jointly defined the term in regulations as follows: “[j]eopardize the 
continued existence of means to engage in an action that reasonably would be expected, directly or 
indirectly, to reduce appreciably the likelihood of both the survival and recovery of a listed species in 
the wild by reducing the reproduction, numbers, or distribution of that species.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 
(2015). 
 45 See Daniel J. Rohlf, Jeopardy Under the Endangered Species Act: Playing a Game Protected 
Species Can’t Win, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 114, 119–21 (2001) (describing the formal consultation pro-
cess). 
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imize and mitigate the take.46 These mandatory terms and conditions are found 
in the section of a biological opinion called an “incidental take statement,” 
which serves as formal authorization from the FWS or NMFS for the action 
agency to proceed with the activity despite the fact that listed species will be 
taken.47 The action agency could thus receive this authorization provided that 
(1) the action agency—and any third party funded or licensed by the action 
agency—strictly adheres to the terms and conditions of the incidental take 
statement,48 and (2) the level of take authorized by the FWS or NMFS is not 
exceeded during the implementation of the activity.49 
In the 1973 Act, Congress did not set forth any similar incidental take 
framework for authorizing private activities anticipated to take listed species 
where such activities have no federal nexus.50 Instead, the only other limited 
exception to the take prohibition was in section 10, which contained a process 
by which the FWS or NMFS could issue “permits” for “any act otherwise pro-
hibited by section 9 of this Act for scientific purposes or to enhance the propa-
gation or survival of the affected species.”51 Although the section 10 permit 
mechanism encompasses two distinct types of conservation-focused activi-
ties—those aimed at scientific research efforts aiding in species recovery and 
those seeking to breed listed species in order to increase population numbers in 
the wild to stave off extinction—Congress made it expressly clear that such 
recovery or enhancement permits could only issue for activities the sole pur-
pose of which was to ameliorate the status of an at-risk species by seeking to 
eliminate or otherwise mitigate the threats facing it.52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)–(c) (2012) (providing the requirements of the formal consul-
tation process); see also 50 C.F.R. § 402.14 (providing further explication of the requirements of the 
formal consultation process). 
 47 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(4). 
 48 See id.; 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(g)(7). 
 49 See 50 C.F.R. § 402.16(a) (“If the amount or extent of taking specified in the incidental take 
statement is exceeded, . . . . [r]einitiation of formal consultation is required and shall be requested by 
the [f]ederal agency or by the Service, where discretionary [f]ederal involvement or control over the 
action has been retained or is authorized by law.”). 
 50 Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 896 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1539) (providing two exceptions to the take prohibition that did not include incidental take authori-
zation). 
 51 Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 14 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EN-
DANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, supra note 30, at 439. These types of permits existed in predecessor 
legislation to the ESA. See A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, 
supra note 30, at 1 (explaining that 1969 legislation concerning endangered species protection con-
tained “[l]imited exceptions for scientific, educational, zoological or propagational purposes . . . under 
strict permitting procedures”). 
 52 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 93-412, at 17 (“Any such activities to encourage propagation or sur-
vival may take place in captivity . . . so long as this is found to provide the most practicable and real-
istic opportunity to encourage the development of the species concerned.”). 
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Indeed, Congress explicitly recognized in the statute the importance of 
both scientific research and propagation activities in achieving species recov-
ery, explaining in the definition of “conserve” that agencies must use “all 
methods and procedures which are necessary” to achieve recovery.53 Such 
methods include “all activities associated with scientific resources manage-
ment such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acquisition and 
maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation.”54 Hence, Con-
gress plainly intended in section 10 that the FWS and NMFS grant recovery or 
enhancement permits for legitimate scientific and propagation endeavors, so 
that the Act’s take prohibition would not stymie efforts to save and recover 
listed species on the brink of extinction.55 
The final provision of the 1973 Act worth noting is Congress’ inclusion of 
a citizen suit provision in section 11(g).56 To ensure that the ESA is appropri-
ately enforced, Congress mandated that, “any person may commence a civil 
suit . . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other gov-
ernmental instrumentality or agency . . . who is alleged to be in violation of 
any provision of this [Act] or regulation issued under the authority thereof.”57 
In reviewing this provision, the Supreme Court explained that it is “an authori-
zation of remarkable breadth when compared with the language Congress or-
dinarily uses” when creating private rights of action in environmental stat-
utes.58 As such, the Court stated, “the obvious purpose of the particular provi-
sion in question is to encourage enforcement by so-called ‘private attorneys 
general.’”59 Not surprisingly, therefore, the existence of this broad citizen suit 
provision and the ever-present threat of litigation have played a critical role in 
reinforcing the objectives of the Act and ensuring compliance with the take 
prohibition and the specific mechanisms set forth by the Act for obtaining take 
authorization.60 
                                                                                                                           
 53 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2012) (defining “conserve” to include, “to bring any endangered species 
or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act are no longer 
necessary”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-470, at 2–3 (1973), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, supra note 30, at 427–28 (defining “conserve” in the bill 
that would become the ESA). 
 54 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3); see H.R. REP. NO. 93-470, at 3. 
 55 See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3). 
 56 Id. § 1540(g); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-470, at 18–19 (providing for a citizen suit in the bill 
that would become the ESA). 
 57 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-470, at 18 (providing for a citizen suit in 
the bill that would become the ESA). 
 58 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164–65 (1997). 
 59 Id. at 165. 
 60 See Kirsten Nathanson et al., Developments in ESA Citizen Suits and Citizen Enforcement of 
Wildlife Laws, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Winter 2015, at 15, 15. 
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B. TVA v. Hill and the 1978 Amendments 
After nearly five years of implementation of the ESA without a need for 
statutory amendment, one high-profile ESA controversy landed before the Su-
preme Court and resulted in ramifications that are still being felt today: the 
case of TVA v. Hill.61 
The legal battle pitted the highly imperiled snail darter—a “three-inch, 
tannish colored fish” listed as endangered by the FWS—against the Tennessee 
Valley Authority’s (“TVA”) attempts to complete construction and operation of 
the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River.62 As “a wholly owned public 
corporation of the United States,” TVA began constructing the Tellico Dam in 
1967—six years before Congress passed the ESA—upon receiving funds from 
Congress to carry out the work.63 By the time the case reached the Supreme 
Court in 1978, the dam had yet to open.64 “[D]espite the fact that construction 
ha[d] been virtually completed and the dam [wa]s essentially ready for opera-
tion,” two things stood in the way: “a tangle of lawsuits and administrative 
proceedings” and the 1973 discovery of the snail darter and its subsequent 
ESA listing in 1975.65 
Congress certainly did not help clarify how TVA and the FWS should 
proceed under the circumstances, where an explicit conflict existed between a 
congressionally funded hydroelectric project and a species protected by a re-
cently enacted federal law.66 Rather than amend the ESA to reconcile this con-
flict, Congress held hearings in 1975 and then simply appropriated additional 
federal funds to TVA for further dam construction.67 In the wake of that action, 
in February of 1976, a group of citizen plaintiffs filed suit under the ESA’s cit-
izen suit provision, “seeking to enjoin completion of the dam and impound-
                                                                                                                           
 61 437 U.S. 153, 153 (1978) (decided in 1978, five years after the enactment of the ESA); Na-
thanson et al., supra note 60, at 15. 
 62 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 156–59. For a more detailed discussion of the Tellico Dam saga, see 
Zygmunt Plater, Classic Lessons from a Little Fish in a Pork Barrel: Featuring the Notorious Story of 
the Endangered Snail Darter and the TVA’s Last Dam, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 211 (2012). 
 63 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 157. 
 64 Id. at 157–61. 
 65 Id. 
 66 See id. at 163–64 (explaining that in response to TVA’s argument that the ESA should not 
prevent a project that was “authorized, funded, and substantially constructed before the Act,” Con-
gress approved the TVA general budget in 1975, despite the violation of the newly enacted ESA of 
1973). 
 67 Id. The result of the hearing was a June 20, 1975, report by the House Committee on Appropri-
ations, which stated the following regarding its recommendation for $29 million to be appropriated for 
the completion of the dam: “The Committee directs that the project, for which an environmental im-
pact statement has been completed and provided [to] the Committee, should be completed as promptly 
as possible . . . .” H. R. REP. NO. 94-319, at 76 (1975). 
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ment of the reservoir on the ground that those actions would violate the Act by 
directly causing the extinction of the species.”68 
After a bench trial, the district court ultimately found that completion of 
the Tellico Dam would “result in the adverse modification, if not complete de-
struction, of the snail darter’s critical habitat,” making it “highly probable” 
that, “the continued existence of the snail darter” would be “jeopardize[d].”69 
Despite this finding, however, the court denied the injunction sought by the 
plaintiffs, reasoning that Congress could not have intended for a nearly com-
plete project to be permanently shelved because of the belated discovery of an 
ESA-listed species that would be eradicated by project completion.70 
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
district court, halting the project and ordering “that a permanent injunction is-
sue halting all activities incident to the Tellico Project which may destroy or 
modify the critical habitat of the snail darter.”71 The Sixth Circuit challenged 
Congress to resolve the controversy it had created, expressly enjoining the pro-
ject “until Congress, by appropriate legislation, exempt[ed] Tellico from com-
pliance with the Act or the snail darter ha[d] been deleted from the list of en-
dangered species or its critical habitat materially redefined.”72 
As with many epic legal sagas, this one was not complete until the Su-
preme Court had the final say on the legal questions presented.73 In reviewing 
the case, the Court summarized the conundrum created by Congress’ compet-
ing priorities in the ESA and appropriations bills as follows: 
It may seem curious to some that the survival of a relatively small 
number of three-inch fish among all the countless millions of spe-
cies extant would require the permanent halting of a virtually com-
pleted dam for which Congress has expended more than $100 mil-
lion. The paradox is not minimized by the fact that Congress contin-
ued to appropriate large sums of public money for the project, even 
after congressional Appropriations Committees were apprised of its 
apparent impact upon the survival of the snail darter. We conclude, 
however, that the explicit provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
require precisely that result.74 
                                                                                                                           
 68 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 164. 
 69 Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 757 (D. Tenn. 1976). 
 70 Id. at 758–63. 
 71 Hill v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 549 F.2d 1064, 1075 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
 74 TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 172–73. 
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Relying on the fact that, “[o]ne would be hard pressed to find a statutory provi-
sion whose terms were any plainer than those in [section] 7 of the [ESA]”—
indeed, the “language admits of no exception”—the Court held that it had no 
choice but to rule in favor of the snail darter, given the patent ESA violation.75 
The Court thus permanently enjoined the project because “examination of the 
language, history, and structure of the [ESA] indicates beyond doubt that Con-
gress intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”76 
Echoing the Sixth Circuit’s call for Congress to amend the Act should it disa-
gree with the result of literal application of the ESA, the Court explained that, 
“[i]t is not for us to speculate, much less act, on whether Congress would have 
altered its stance had the specific events of this case been anticipated.”77 The 
dissenting justices also urged Congress to amend the ESA to inject flexibility, 
asserting that they “have little doubt that Congress will amend the [ESA] to 
prevent the grave consequences made possible by [the majority’s] decision.”78 
Congress did not wait long to pick up the gauntlet thrown down by the 
Court; it immediately “began to craft and pass elaborate amendment provisions 
for ESA [section] 7” and other provisions of the Act, as a means of making the 
ESA less rigid.79 With respect to section 7, Congress made sweeping revisions 
that both fleshed out the interagency consultation process and added an ele-
ment of flexibility that did not exist in the 1973 Act.80 Congress created a lim-
ited exemption for federally authorized or funded projects—such as the nearly-
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. at 173. 
 76 Id. at 174. 
 77 Id. at 185. Of course, the majority’s view was that Congress appeared to have sanctioned, in the 
ESA, certain financial project losses due to application of the ESA’s provisions. See id. at 185–86. 
The majority stated, 
[W]e discern no hint in the deliberations of Congress relating to the 1973 Act that 
would compel a different result than we reach here. Indeed, the repeated expressions of 
congressional concern over what it saw as the potentially enormous danger presented 
by the eradication of any endangered species suggest how the balance would have been 
struck had the issue been presented to Congress in 1973. Furthermore, it is clear Con-
gress foresaw that [section] 7 would, on occasion, require agencies to alter ongoing pro-
jects in order to fulfill the goals of the Act. 
Id. 
 78 Id. at 210 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Plater, supra note 62, at 230 & n.59 (“[T]he citizens 
themselves had argued” that, “an injunction from the Court would and should be the catalyst for ‘a 
remand to legislature,’ forcing Congress to do what the farmers had so long hoped for, an objective 
analysis of the true merits of the pork barrel dam versus the rich resources of the river and its valley 
. . . .”). 
 79 See Plater, supra note 62, at 230–31. 
 80 See id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 1, 2–10 (1978), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973, supra note 30, at 1192, 1193–1201 (providing a 
process by which the acting agency must consult with the Secretary of FWS and establishing a com-
mittee that could exempt a take from ESA requirements). 
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completed Tellico Dam—that could proceed under certain circumstances,81 
despite the fact that such projects would “jeopardize the continued existence” 
of the species at issue.82 The former set of amendments were relatively benign 
and provided clear guidance to action agencies, as well as to the FWS and 
NMFS, as to their specific obligations during the formal consultation pro-
cess.83 The latter set of amendments, however, created for the first time, the 
“Endangered Species Committee”—colloquially referred to as the “God 
Squad” because of the power wielded by the committee of Cabinet-level de-
partment heads.84 The God Squad can review applications for an exemption 
from the requirements of section 7, and grant such exemptions if certain condi-
                                                                                                                           
 81 Plater, supra note 62, at 230–31 (explaining that the ESA created the Endangered Species 
Committee to decide when an exemption may be granted, based on the public interests of allowing the 
agency action). The conference report describes the process of applying for an exemption permit and 
the conditions under which the Committee will grant the exemption as when, 
[T]here are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency action[;] . . . the bene-
fits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of alternative courses of action con-
sistent with conserving the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the public 
interest; and . . . the action is of regional or national significance. 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 5–8. It further states that the Committee must also “establish . . . such rea-
sonable mitigation and enhancement measures, including, but not limited to, live propagation, trans-
plantation, and habitat acquisition and improvement, as are necessary and appropriate to minimize the 
adverse effects of the agency action upon the endangered species, threatened species, or critical habi-
tat concerned.” Id. 
 82 Plater, supra note 62, at 230–31; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 1, 2–10 (providing speci-
fications of the process by which an agency may apply for an exemption where the “agency action 
may jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered or threatened species”). 
 83 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)–(d) (2012); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 2–3 (describing the 
requirements of the interagency consultation process). 
 84 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(p); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 3–10 (describing the Endangered 
Species Committee and the circumstances in which it may grant exemptions); Plater, supra note 62, at 
230–31 (describing the power of the “God Squad”). It is important to note that although the God 
Squad exemption process was created to serve broader purposes under the Act than merely resolving 
the Tellico Dam project, Congress’ short-term intent was clear: “[t]he conflict between the snail darter 
and the Tellico Dam was the [s]ection 7 God [Squad’s] first assignment.” Plater, supra note 62, at 
231. In that first exercise of the God Squad procedure, on the basis of an economic study, “the God 
Squad unanimously determined the dam project, even with 95% of its budget spent, still did not make 
sufficient economic sense to justify spending even the last 5% of its appropriated costs.” Id. Despite 
the God Squad’s verdict, Congress took matters into its own hands. “[I]n forty-two seconds in an 
emptying House chamber, TVA’s pro-dam public works allies slipped a rider onto an appropriations 
bill repealing all laws hindering the Tellico Dam, and ordered the reservoir’s completion.” Id. at 232 
& n.64; see also Presidential Statement on Signing H.R. 4388 into Law, II PUB. PAPERS 1760–61 
(Sept. 25, 1979) (enacted), reprinted in A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
OF 1973, supra note 30, at 1301–02 (explaining that the appropriations Act overturned the careful 
decision of the Endangered Species Committee that had unanimously determined that the project was 
not economically viable and expressing regret at signing the bill). As a result, “the TVA was ultimate-
ly able to finish the dam, close the gates, and flood the valley on November 28, 1979.” Plater, supra 
note 62, at 233. 
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tions are satisfied.85 When the dust settled from the 1978 ESA amendments, 
“[s]ection 7 [had] mushroomed from its 1973 text of 129 words to its present 
total of [4603]”—an increase of more than 3500 percent.86 
Accordingly, as the 1970s came to a close, Congress had created only 
three limited exceptions to the statute’s strict liability take prohibition: (1) non-
jeopardizing federal projects (or projects authorized or funded by federal agen-
cies) that had been permitted to proceed and granted authorization under the 
section 7 consultation process;87 (2) jeopardizing federal projects (or projects 
authorized or funded by federal agencies) for which the God Squad had grant-
ed an exemption from the ESA’s requirements;88 and (3) scientific research and 
species propagation efforts that had received section 10 recovery or enhance-
ment permits from the FWS or NMFS.89 As such, there was no mechanism 
available for exempting species take for projects that lacked a federal nexus,90 
which became Congress’ focal point with regard to the ESA in the early 1980s. 
C. The 1982 Amendments: Creation of the ITP Process 
Two key events in the early 1980s spurred Congress into action regarding 
the ESA; this time to address a unique species take situation not covered by the 
section 7 interagency consultation process or the section 10 recovery or en-
hancement permit process: a private, State, or other project lacking a federal 
                                                                                                                           
 85 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(p). 
 86 Plater, supra note 62, at 231. Although not directly germane to the narrow focus of this Article, 
Congress made other revisions to the ESA in 1978 that strengthened the protections afforded to listed 
species. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5) (defining “critical habitat” for purposes of section 1533). Most 
notably, Congress included a new provision in section 4 of the Act requiring that the FWS or NMFS 
designate critical habitat for a species concurrent with ESA listing, and included a complementary 
provision in section 3 of the Act defining “critical habitat.” See id. § 1533(a)(3)(A) (requiring the 
Secretary to designate the habitat of endangered or threatened species as “critical habitat” in certain 
circumstances); see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 1–2, 13–16 (defining “critical habitat” and creat-
ing the requirement of designating a “critical habitat” and providing the specifications of this determi-
nation). Congress also imposed an obligation on the FWS and NMFS to prepare recovery plans that 
would set forth specific guidelines and objectives for achieving species recovery. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f); 
see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1804, at 15 (providing for the development and implementation of recov-
ery plans). 
 87 See Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 892 (1973) (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. § 1536); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (describing the specific interagency 
consultation process that included the consulting agency authorizing incidental take when a federal 
project was found not to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species). 
 88 See Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, 3752–
53 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1533) (establishing the Endangered Species Committee and 
the requirements for exemptions). 
 89 See Endangered Species Act, 87 Stat. at 896 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(A)). 
 90 U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., HABITAT CONSERVATION 
PLANNING AND INCIDENTAL TAKE PERMIT PROCESSING HANDBOOK 1-1 (1996), available at http://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/pdfs/laws/hcp_handbook.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G96M-GRCW. 
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nexus that would incidentally affect a listed species. The first event was anoth-
er controversial court ruling in the case of Palila v. Hawaii Department of 
Land and Natural Resources, and the second event was a collaborative com-
promise to resolve a development conflict with listed species.91 
1. The Case of Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources 
In 1979, in Palila, conservation organizations sued the State of Hawaii, 
challenging the State’s management of feral sheep and goats for sport hunting 
purposes.92 The organizations argued that the feral animals were destroying 
critical habitat in the mamane-naio forest for the endangered Palila (an endem-
ic bird species found only in Hawaii) and thereby causing “harm” to the spe-
cies, in violation of section 9 of the ESA.93 As the district court observed: 
“[t]he bird has evolved in the mamane-naio ecosystem over the centuries and 
is uniquely adapted to feeding upon the mamane,” “[t]he mamane trees pro-
vide food, shelter and nest sites for the Palila,” and “[t]he naio trees are of sec-
ondary importance as nest sites.”94 The State did not dispute that its manage-
ment of the feral game animals was adversely affecting the Palila’s critical 
habitat.95 Rather, the State primarily argued that section 9 had no applicability 
to the State because such enforcement is precluded by the Tenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.96 The district court rejected this argument as groundless 
in light of the ESA’s statutory scheme.97 In turn, the court ordered the State “to 
initiate steps for complete removal of feral sheep and goats from the Palila’s 
critical habitat within two years.”98 
The State appealed the district court decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit.99 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision, 
noting that the ESA “prohibits the taking of any endangered species” without 
exception, in light of the fact that the State’s management of feral animals 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See infra notes 92–114 and accompanying text. 
 92 Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res. (Palila I), 471 F. Supp. 985, 987 (D. Haw. 1979). 
 93Id. at 987–89. 
 94 Id. at 989. 
 95 See id. at 990–91. The court explained that the defendants understood the impact of the game 
animals on the ecosystem, resulting from the animals consuming seedlings and shoots of the mamane, 
and thus preventing regeneration of the forest. Id. at 991. The court further explained that, “Plaintiffs 
have shown (and defendants have produced no substantial evidence to the contrary) that the Palila 
requires all of its designated critical habitat in order to survive as a species and that the feral sheep and 
goats maintained by defendants are the major cause of that habitat’s degradation.” Id. 
 96 Id. at 992. 
 97 Id. at 992–99. 
 98 Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural Res. (Palila II), 639 F.2d 495, 497 (9th Cir. 1981); 
Palila I, 471 F. Supp. at 999. 
 99 Palila II, 639 F.2d at 495–96 (stating that the district court had granted summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiffs and noting that two issues had been raised on appeal). 
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lacks any federal nexus.100 Hence, the court explained that, “[t]he only facts 
material to this case are those relating to the questions whether the Palila is an 
endangered species and, if so, whether the defendants’ actions amounted to a 
taking.”101 Reviewing those questions, the court held that, “[t]he defendants’ 
action in maintaining feral sheep and goats in the critical habitat is a violation 
of the Act since it was shown that the Palila was endangered by the activity,” 
and thus found that, “complete eradication of the feral animals is necessary to 
prevent harm to the Palila.”102 This ruling—the first successful section 9 citi-
zen enforcement action against a project lacking a federal nexus—had ripple 
effects felt far and wide by States and private landowners.103 
2. The Grand Compromise: The San Bruno Mountain HCP 
Around the time the Ninth Circuit issued its landmark ruling in Palila, 
various stakeholders were negotiating in California in an attempt to avoid ESA 
litigation concerning another activity lacking a federal nexus that would take 
listed species.104 At issue was the fate of San Bruno Mountain, where a private 
developer seeking to construct commercial and residential units on the moun-
tain faced opposition from environmental organizations seeking to conserve 
the mountain to protect the dozens of unique wildlife species inhabiting it.105 
The developer—Visitacion Associates—purchased practically all of the land 
on the mountain in the early 1970s, and planned to “develop approximately 
[7655] residential units and 2,000,000 square feet of office and commercial 
space.”106 In response to consequent public opposition, San Mateo County 
adopted a new management plan for San Bruno Mountain that would permit 
less commercial and residential development, while preserving the remainder 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See id. at 497. 
 101 See id. 
 102 Id. at 497–98. 
 103 Another round of litigation over the Palila followed, in which the Ninth Circuit again found 
the State of Hawaii to be acting in violation of the ESA. See Palila v. Haw. Dep’t of Land & Natural 
Res. (Palila III), 852 F.2d 1106, 1106–10 (9th Cir. 1988). Although irrelevant to the focus of this 
Article, it is worth noting that at least one Supreme Court justice has called into question whether, as 
the Ninth Circuit held in the second round of litigation, the “harm” form of take encompasses activi-
ties that only indirectly cause the harm contemplated in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 713–14 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 104 See Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 979 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 105 See id. For a more detailed discussion of the history of the San Bruno conservation plan, see 
Craig A. Arnold, Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endan-
gered Species Act on Land Use Development, 10 STANFORD ENVTL. L. J. 1, 18–24 (1991), and Lin-
dell Marsh, Conservation Planning Under the Endangered Species Act: A New Paradigm for Con-
serving Biological Diversity, 8 TULANE ENVTL. L. J. 97, 98–111 (1994). 
 106 Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 979. 
276 Environmental Affairs [Vol. 42:259 
of the mountain as open space.107 After litigating against the County over this 
scaled-back development plan, Visitacion Associates settled the suit in 1980 
and agreed to develop approximately one-third of the mountain and to sell or 
donate the remaining two-thirds of the mountain specifically for use as a pub-
lic park.108 
Despite reaching this settlement, their work was far from over. “Shortly 
after the settlement was reached, the [FWS] found that the Mission Blue but-
terfly, which was on the endangered species list, inhabited the Mountain.”109 
Although there was no mechanism available in the ESA to authorize any takes 
by a project of this sort in the absence of a federal nexus,110 stakeholder groups 
nevertheless “formed the San Bruno Mountain Steering Committee to formu-
late a plan that would both protect the endangered species and allow some de-
velopment of the Mountain.”111 The committee included representatives from 
Visitacion, landowners, the County, and three cities that would be affected by 
the outcome, as well as officials from the FWS and the California Department 
of Fish and Game.112 
On the basis of a detailed biological study overseen by the committee, in 
1981 the committee began preparing what it called a “habitat conservation 
plan,” which set forth the specific commitments made by each party, along 
with an implementing agreement that executed the plan and bound the commit-
tee members to its terms.113 The final terms of the plan “dedicated 793 private-
ly owned acres to local agencies as permanent open space, preserved 81% of 
the open space on the Mountain as undisturbed habitat with another 3% of 
open space to be restored after temporary disturbances during construction,” 
“required lot owners on the Mountain to contribute $60,000 annually to fi-
nance a permanent habitat conservation program” supervised by the county, 
and limited construction disturbance to “only 14% of the present habitat of the 
Mountain’s population of Mission Blue butterflies.”114  
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. 
 110 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 111 Friends of Endangered Species, 760 F.2d at 979. 
 112 Id. at 979–80. 
 113 Id. at 980. 
 114 Id. 
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3. Congress’ 1982 Amendments to the ESA 
To many, the result of the hard-fought compromise over San Bruno 
Mountain seemed to be a win-win for developers and the species.115 To make it 
a reality, however, the approach needed Congress’ blessing, because the ESA 
did not permit any non-federal activities to take listed species, regardless of 
any proposed measures aimed at minimizing or mitigating the take associated 
with those activities (or even if the project would have a net benefit for the 
species).116 Thus, committee members urged Congress to formally adopt a new 
exemption to the take prohibition that would permit private development pro-
jects—or others like them that lack a federal nexus—to obtain take authoriza-
tion from the FWS or NMFS, so long as certain conditions are satisfied.117 
Agreeing that this was a sound approach and was consistent with the 
Act’s objectives, in 1982 Congress amended the Act to create the incidental 
take permit (“ITP”) program, which authorized the FWS and NMFS to permit 
“any taking otherwise prohibited by section [9 of the ESA] if such taking is 
incidental to, and not the purpose of, the carrying out of an otherwise lawful 
activity.”118 In designing the ITP permit scheme, Congress cited favorably to 
the San Bruno Mountain conservation plan.119 It went so far as to adopt “the 
San Bruno Mountain plan [a]s the model for this long term permit,” against 
which “the adequacy of similar conservation plans should be measured.”120 
Not surprisingly, therefore, Congress designated as a key feature of the ITP 
process the development of a habitat conservation plan (“HCP”), and institu-
tionally built into the ESA what it viewed as the four primary strengths of the 
San Bruno Mountain plan: 
(1) “[P]reserv[ing] sufficient habitat to allow for enhancement of the 
survival of the species”; 
(2) “establish[ing] . . . a funding program [that] will provide perma-
nent on-going funding for important habitat management and en-
hancement activities”; 
                                                                                                                           
 115 Id. (explaining that the San Bruno Mountain HCP “provide[d] an approach by which habitat 
protection and real estate development on the Mountain would take place at the same time”). 
 116 See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 117 See Endangered Species Act Reauthorization and Oversight: Hearing on H.R. 97-32 Before 
the Subcomm. on Fisheries & Wildlife Conservation & the Env’t of the Comm. on Merchant Marine & 
Fisheries, 97th Cong. 340 (1982) (statement of Lindell Marsh) (“I think it is important to stress the 
need for some kind of statement in the [A]ct that this is the kind of process that can be used and that 
the [f]ederal [g]overnment condones and encourages it.”). 
 118 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B) (2012); H.R. REP. No. 97-835, at 29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870. 
 119 H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 30–31. 
 120 Id. 
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(3) establishing “a permanent institutional structure to insure uni-
form protection and conservation of the habitat . . . despite the di-
vision of the habitat by the overlapping jurisdiction of various 
governmental agencies and the complex pattern of private and 
public ownership”; and 
(4) “ensur[ing] that all elements of the plan will be implemented” 
through a formal agreement.121 
By injecting rigorous requirements into the ITP issuance criteria,122 Con-
gress made clear that, “[o]btaining an ITP, and thus immunity from section 9 
take prohibitions, . . . requires much more than just asking for one.”123 For ex-
ample, ITP applicants must specify in their HCP: 
(i) [T]he impact which will likely result from such taking; (ii) what 
steps the applicant will take to minimize and mitigate such impacts, 
and the funding that will be available to implement such steps; (iii) 
what alternative actions to such taking the applicant considered and 
the reasons why such alternatives are not being utilized; and (iv) 
such other measures that the Secretary may require as being neces-
sary or appropriate for purposes of the plan.124  
Moreover, because the FWS’s or NMFS’s issuance of an ITP to a third party is 
itself necessarily a “major [f]ederal action . . . significantly affecting the quali-
ty of the human environment” through its authorization of development-related 
activities,125 the issuing agency must prepare an environmental impact state-
ment under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and solicit pub-
lic comment on the ITP and NEPA analysis prior to ITP issuance.126 In addi-
tion, because the FWS or NMFS is serving the role of an action agency in issu-
ing an ITP, the issuing agency must also “self-consult” pursuant to section 7 of 
the ESA, to ensure that ITP issuance will not “jeopardize the continued exist-
ence” of any listed species.127 Finally, after reviewing the HCP, the NEPA 
                                                                                                                           
 121 Id. at 32. 
 122 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2) (requiring any ITP applicant to submit a conservation plan with 
certain specifications to the Secretary). 
 123 Wheeler, supra note 37, at 222. 
 124 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(A) (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 13. 
 125 See National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); Rohlf, supra 
note 45, at 125. 
 126 See, e.g., Wheeler, supra note 37, at 223. 
 127 Id.; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring the action agency to consult the Secretary to 
ensure that the action is “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species”); 
H.R.REP. NO. 97-567, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2831 (explaining the deci-
sion to retain the duty for any action agency to consult the Secretary). The fact that the ITP process 
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analysis, and the biological opinion, the issuing agency must, before an ITP 
can issue, make specific findings that: 
(i) [T]he taking will be incidental; (ii) the applicant will, to the max-
imum extent practicable, minimize and mitigate the impacts of such 
taking; (iii) the applicant will ensure that adequate funding for the 
plan will be provided; (iv) the taking will not appreciably reduce the 
likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild; 
and (v) the measures, if any, required [as necessary and appropriate] 
will be met.128 
 In creating the ITP process, Congress made clear its view that this type of 
permit is distinct from any pre-1982 exemptions in the ESA for federal pro-
jects under section 7 or recovery or enhancement efforts under section 10.129 
For example, the Senate Report explained that the amendment “should lead to 
resolution of potential conflicts between endangered species and the actions of 
private developers, while at the same time encouraging these developers to 
become more actively involved in the conservation of these species.”130 Like-
wise, the House Report explained that the ITP provision specifically applies to 
situations where “the unintentional taking may occur on private lands owned 
by a developer who has no need of a federal permit” because “these individu-
als have no access to the consultation and exemption provisions of the Act” but 
are “subject to the taking prohibitions of Section 9.”131 Thus, the ITP process 
                                                                                                                           
requires section 7 self-consultation is critical for attaching the ESA jeopardy standard to ITP permits. 
See Rohlf, supra note 45, at 114, 120, 125. One commentator has explained that, “the jeopardy stand-
ard provides the bottom line for the ESA’s section 10 process for issuing permits authorizing ‘inci-
dental take,’ which in recent years has become the federal government’s key regulatory mechanism 
for influencing non-federal actions that affect protected species,” because, 
The ESA actually requires two jeopardy analyses before FWS or NMFS can approve an 
HCP and issue an [ITP:] [f]irst, among section 10’s list of findings required for issu-
ance of an incidental take permit, the Services must find that the taking, if approved, 
“will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species 
in the wild” . . . . [, and second, the] issuance of an [ITP] constitutes a federal action 
that obviously may affect one or more listed species . . . . [, therefore requiring that the] 
FWS or NMFS must engage in section 7 consultation (with itself) prior to issuing such 
a permit. 
Id. 
 128 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(2)(B); see also Wheeler, supra note 37, at 223 (describing the process an 
ITP applicant must go through to obtain a permit). 
 129 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 10 (1982); H.R. REP. NO. 97-567, at 15; H.R. REP. NO. 97-
835, at 29 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2870; see also U.S. FISH & 
WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at 1-2. 
 130 S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 131 H.R. 6133, 97th Cong. (1982) (emphasis added). During the floor debate, Congressman For-
sythe stated, 
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“establishes a procedure” that “addresses the concerns of private landowners 
who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions not requiring [f]ederal 
permits prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking.”132 
Accordingly, as made plain by Congress in amending the ESA, an ITP 
was created because it is the only mechanism for authorizing take where the 
underlying purpose of the project at issue is private development.133 As such, 
what defines ITP eligibility is the purpose of the activity at issue.134 Thus, in 
Congress’ eyes, the only means by which a private development project lack-
ing a federal nexus—or, by the same token, a State or local development pro-
ject or management scheme lacking a federal nexus—may proceed, despite the 
fact that the project will incidentally take a listed species, is by first obtaining 
an ITP.135 Indeed, as Congress explained, the fact that a private development 
project will result in net benefits to a listed species—through mitigation 
measures, scientific research, or other efforts—does not negate the requirement 
that an ITP must be obtained prior to project construction and operation.136 
It is against this backdrop that the remainder of this Article analyzes the 
Fish and Wildlife Service’s misapplication of section 10.137 
II. THE FWS’S HISTORICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 10 OF THE ESA 
 Soon after Congress’ creation of the incidental take permit (“ITP”) pro-
gram under the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) in 1982, the U.S. Fish and 
                                                                                                                           
Other businessmen confront a different problem [from that facing federal projects that 
will take listed species]. Their projects occur on private lands and they are, therefore, 
unable to enter into the consultation and exemption process. They are, however, still 
governed by the section 9 prohibitions of the act. For these businessmen, H.R. 6133 
creates a special permit procedure whereby they may be given a permit to take endan-
gered species if the taking is incidental to, and not the purpose of, the project in ques-
tion and the taking is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of the species. 
128 CONG. REC. H3246 (daily ed. June 8, 1982) (statement of Congressman Forsythe) (emphasis 
added). 
 132 H.R. REP. NO. 97-835, at 29. 
 133 See id. 
 134 See id. 
 135 Id. (explaining that this amendment provides a way for private landowners to conduct other-
wise lawful actions that violate section 9 take prohibitions, provided that the landowners follow the 
procedures for receiving a permit and the action “will not jeopardize the continued existence of the 
species”). 
 136 S. REP. NO. 97-418, at 10 (1982) (recognizing that, “[i]n some cases, the overall effect of a 
project can be beneficial to a species, even though some incidental taking may occur” pursuant to an 
FWS- or NMS-approved ITP). 
 137 Congress amended the ESA in 1988 and 2004, though neither of those amendments are ger-
mane to the substance of this Article. See Endangered Species Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., 
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/esa-history.html (last updated July 15, 2013), archived 
at http://perma.cc/6BVA-QRM9. 
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Wildlife Service (“FWS”) issued the first-ever ITP and approved the underly-
ing habitat conservation plan (“HCP”) for development of San Bruno Moun-
tain.138 The HCP included many of the minimization and mitigation hallmarks 
that are still seen in HCPs today. It “contain[ed] various measures to ‘minimize 
and mitigate’ the impact of the project upon the Mission Blue butterfly,” in-
cluding “the permanent protection of [eighty-six percent] of the Mission Blue’s 
habitat,” “funding for the Plan would yield $60,000 annually, which would be 
used to halt the apparent incursion of brush and gorse into the habitat and per-
mit the re-establishment of grasslands for the butterfly,” and “continuing and 
comprehensive restrictions on land development and significant financial in-
centives[,] . . . . [which] should play a significant role in enhancing the protec-
tion of endangered species on the Mountain.”139 In evaluating the adequacy of 
the ITP and HCP, the FWS prepared an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) 
under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) analyzing the envi-
ronmental impacts of issuing the ITP and the agency also engaged in section 7 
self-consultation, which culminated in a biological opinion concluding that the 
ITP would not result in jeopardy to the listed species residing on San Bruno 
Mountain.140 Although a local conservation organization challenged the FWS’s 
issuance of the San Bruno Mountain ITP as arbitrary and capricious and being 
based on flawed biological surveys, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit ultimately resolved the issue in the FWS’s favor.141 The court held that 
the ITP would not result in jeopardy to any listed species and the mitigation 
efforts were sufficient to avoid the FWS’s duty to prepare an environmental 
impact statement because the ITP likely would not result in significant im-
pacts, as that term is defined under NEPA.142 
Perhaps because of the protracted and expensive legal wrangling that fol-
lowed the FWS’s issuance of the model ITP (the “San Bruno Mountain ITP”), 
very few ITPs were sought in the first decade after Congress created the ITP 
                                                                                                                           
 138 See Issuance of Permit for Incidental Take of Endangered Species, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,136, 
10,136 (Mar. 10, 1983); CNTY. OF SAN MATEO PARKS DEP’T, SAN BRUNO MOUNTAIN HABITAT 
CONSERVATION PLAN (1982), available at http://parks.smcgov.org/sites/parks.smcgov.org/files/
documents/files/SBM_HCP_Final_Volume1_November1982.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CZB5-
T43W. 
 139 Friends of Endangered Species, Inc. v. Jantzen, 760 F.2d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 140 Id. at 980–81. 
 141 Id. at 981–89. 
 142 Id. It should be noted that because ITPs are often in place for long durations of thirty years or 
more, many of the earliest ITPs—including the San Bruno Mountain ITP—are still in existence. See 
San Bruno Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP), CNTY. OF SAN MATEO PARKS DEP’T, 
https://parks.smcgov.org/documents/san-bruno-mountain-habitat-conservation-plan-hcp (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/65LM-URB9 (explaining that San Mateo County “admin-
isters the San Bruno Mountain HCP by reporting to the HCP Trustees . . . and interacting with the 
[FWS]”). 
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process.143 By 1992, only fourteen ITPs, including the San Bruno Mountain 
ITP, had been issued.144 With the ITP program on life support, “interest was 
revived by the Clinton administration,” which viewed the ITP process—with 
certain regulatory reforms—as a means of “modify[ing] the ESA’s perceived 
inflexibility and stimulat[ing] private sector involvement in conservation.”145 
The Clinton administration saw “fostering a cooperative partnership with pri-
vate landowners and developers . . . as critical to preserving endangered spe-
cies, given that more than half of endangered or threatened species occupied 
habitats that over [eighty] percent of the time were found on private or state 
lands.”146 
Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt forcefully led this effort to reform the 
ITP process to encourage greater participation by private landowners and de-
velopers, starting with the 1994 joint “No Surprises” policy of the FWS and 
the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”), which was finalized in 
1998.147 The focal point of this new policy was to provide assurances to ITP 
permit-holders that unforeseen circumstances would not cause additional fi-
nancial burdens after an ITP was secured.148 The issuing legislation stated: 
If additional conservation and mitigation measures are deemed nec-
essary to respond to changed circumstances and such measures were 
not provided for in the [HCP’s] operating conservation program, the 
Director will not require any conservation and mitigation measures 
in addition to those provided for in the plan without the consent of 
the permittee.149 
During this same time period, the FWS and NMFS jointly issued their HCP 
Handbook, which provided critical guidance for private landowners and devel-
opers on understanding the nuances of the ITP process.150 In 2000, the FWS 
                                                                                                                           
 143 See Wheeler, supra note 37, at 224–25 (describing the “lackluster performance” of the HCP 
program after the San Bruno Mountain litigation). 
 144 U.S. FISH &WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at i ; see also 
Wheeler, supra note 37, at 223–24 (describing the initial hesitance to the use of HCPs); John Kosty-
ack, NWF v. Babbitt: Victory for Smart Growth and Imperiled Wildlife, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,712, 
10,713 (2001) (noting the fourteen pre-1993 ITPs in the context of the shift toward more HCPs during 
the Clinton administration). 
 145 Wheeler, supra note 37, at 224. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Notice of Availability of Preliminary Draft Handbook for Habitat Conservation Planning and 
Incidental Take Permit Processing, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,782 (Dec. 21, 1994) (memorializing the No Sur-
prises Policy); Habitat Conservation Plan Assurances (“No Surprises”) Rule, 63 Fed. Reg. 8859, 8860 
(Feb. 23, 1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5) (2015)). 
 148 50 C.F.R. § 17.32(b)(5)(ii). 
 149 Id. 
 150 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at i–ii. 
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and NMFS supplemented the HCP Handbook, which, among other things, ex-
tended the minimum public comment period on most ITP-HCPs from thirty 
days to sixty days, and ninety days for “large HCPs,”151 “[b]ecause of the con-
cern that [thirty days] does not provide enough time for members of the public 
to review and provide meaningful comments.”152 
As scholars have explained, and as the numbers justify, “the effects of 
these additional assurances and guidance were profound.”153 In contrast to the 
fourteen ITPs issued between 1982 and 1992 covering a modest amount of 
acreage, 177 ITPs were issued between 1993 and 2000 covering nearly 27 mil-
lion acres in twenty-two States and Puerto Rico—a more than 1300% increase 
in the number of ITPs issued before 1993 and a more than 4400% increase in 
the amount of acreage conserved by pre-1993 HCPs.154 The ITP-HCP surge set 
in motion by the 1990s policy reforms did not slow down in the 2000s, as the 
Bush administration issued 424 ITPs covering more than 22 million acres in 
twenty-three States and Puerto Rico.155 Thus, in only fifteen years, Secretary 
Babbitt’s reforms led to the enrollment of approximately 48 million acres of 
private, State, and municipal land into the ITP-HCP program—more than 2.1% 
of the overall land area of the United States, and 3% of the overall non-federal 
land area.156 
Until recently, the FWS has made clear in implementing the ITP-HCP 
program under section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA, the ITP process is the only 
mechanism available for private landowners and developers to take a listed 
species.157 In so doing, the FWS avoided any blurring of lines between ITPs 
and section 10(a)(1)(A) recovery permits issued for scientific research ef-
forts.158 For example, the HCP Handbook contrasts the two types of permits, 
explaining that, 
A section 10(a)(1)(B) [incidental take] permit only authorizes take 
that is incidental to otherwise lawful activities[,] . . . . [which] means 
economic development or land or water use activities that, while 
they may result in take of federally listed species, are consistent with 
                                                                                                                           
 151 Id. at 6–18 (noting that large-scale or regional HCPs are “often complex and address a variety 
of activities”). 
 152 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ADDENDUM TO 
THE HCP HANDBOOK (2000), available at http://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/Final_
Addendum_QandA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/YK76-WALE. 
 153 Wheeler, supra note 37, at 224. 
 154 Id. at 224–25. 
 155 Id. at 225. 
 156 Id. 
 157 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at 1-1 to 
-2. 
 158 See id. at 1-5. 
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other [f]ederal, state, and local laws. [In contrast,] [t]ake that occurs 
during other types of activities—i.e., take for scientific purposes, to 
enhance the propagation or survival of a listed species, or for pur-
poses of establishment and maintenance of experimental popula-
tions—must be authorized by a permit under section 10(a)(1)(A) of 
the ESA (e.g., “Safe Harbor” or “recovery” permits).159 
The HCP Handbook further elucidates this distinction: 
Other types of activities cannot be authorized by an [ITP] because 
they include actions that are not generally needed to implement an 
HCP or include long-term components that are not ‘incidental’ to the 
activity described in the HCP. Examples of these types of activities 
include holding endangered or threatened animals in captivity for 
propagation purposes or scientific research; euthanizing them for re-
search purposes; and taking tissue samples for laboratory testing. 
However, such activities qualify as take for “scientific purposes” or 
purposes of “enhancement of propagation or survival” and can be 
authorized under section 10(a)(1)(A) of the ESA. If an HCP calls for 
activities of this type, the applicant should specify that the project 
will result in incidental take and take for scientific purposes or for 
purposes of enhancement of propagation or survival. Application re-
quirements for scientific permits must then be addressed . . . . Gen-
erally, if proposed activities are well-described in the HCP, includ-
ing those requiring a scientific permit, and if all incidental take per-
mit application requirements have been met, . . . . [t]he permit issued 
can be a joint section 10(a)(1)(A) section 10(a)(1)(B) permit—i.e., 
only one permit need be issued.160 
Accordingly, as the FWS’s own handbook makes clear, the ESA has two sepa-
rate processes for two very different types of permits, which require that an 
applicant secure both permits—and comply with the distinct requirements of 
each program—if there is any argument that a development or similar project 
also gives rise to scientific research efforts implicating section 10(a)(1)(A) of 
the Act.161 
                                                                                                                           
 159 Id. (emphases added). The HCP Handbook explains that, “[i]n some cases, however, take in 
the form of capture or harassment can be authorized under an incidental take permit, if the purpose of 
such actions is to minimize more serious forms of take (e.g., death or injury) or to conduct monitoring 
programs during activities authorized by the permit.” Id. 
 160 Id. at 7-3. 
 161 See id. 
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This distinction is crucial because the permit issuance criteria are very 
different for the two types of permits.162 First, for example, the public com-
ment period for a section 10(a)(1)(A) recovery permit is only thirty days (and 
even that can be waived by the FWS), whereas the minimum public comment 
period on most section 10(a)(1)(B) ITPs is sixty days (and even longer for cer-
tain ITP-HCPs).163 Second, whereas the FWS must engage in NEPA review 
and prepare an environmental impact statement (“EIS”) or EA for nearly all 
ITP-HCPs (except for a relative few determined to be “low-effect” HCPs), sci-
entific recovery permits are practically always categorically excluded from 
NEPA review because such permits seek not to undertake activities that will 
impact the environment but rather efforts to help recover species from the 
brink of extinction.164 
A third distinction is that each and every ITP-HCP must undergo internal 
FWS or NMFS consultation, which yields a biological opinion.165 The biologi-
cal opinion “represents a last internal ‘check’ that the fundamental standard of 
avoiding jeopardy has been satisfied,” and serves as the means by which the 
issuing agency “develop[s] reasonable and prudent measures and terms and 
conditions to minimize anticipated incidental take, or, if necessary, reasonable 
and prudent alternatives to eliminate the risk of jeopardy.”166 Recovery per-
mits, however, are often subject to a programmatic section 7 consultation and 
biological opinion that exists for a long duration and covers all related scien-
tific recovery activities—even though they have not been analyzed in a site-
specific manner—so long as they do not individually cause jeopardy.167 
                                                                                                                           
 162 See 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2015); U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES 
SERV., supra note 90, at 5-2 to -5, 6-3. 
 163 Compare 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (stating that the FWS “shall publish notice in the Federal Register 
of each application for a [recovery] permit,” which “shall invite the submission from interested par-
ties, within [thirty] days after the date of the notice, of written data, views, or arguments with respect 
to the application” although “[t]he [thirty]-day period may be waived by the Director in an emergency 
situation where the life or health of an endangered animal is threatened”), with U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE 
SERV. & NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., supra note 152 (“Because of the concern that 
[thirty days] does not provide enough time for members of the public to review and provide meaning-
ful comments, the Services extended the minimum comment period for most HCPs to [sixty] days.”). 
 164 Compare U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at 
5-2 (explaining that a FWS “order categorically excludes permits for scientific research and public 
display under the ESA and Marine Mammal Protection Act, and other categories of actions which 
would not have significant environmental impacts including routine operations, routine maintenance, 
actions with short-term effects, or actions of limited size or magnitude), with id. at 5-1 to -6 (describ-
ing application of EIS and EA requirements to most ITP-HCPs). 
 165 Id. at 6-12 to -13. 
 166 Id. at 6-13. 
 167 See, e.g., Memorandum from Kris Olsen, Reg’l Office Recovery Permits Coordinator, U.S. 
Fish & Wildlife Serv., to Chief of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., at 4 (July 10, 
2012) (on file with author) (referring to the January 31, 2012, biological opinion on recovery actions, 
initiated by Region 6 of the FWS, exemplifying the need for such a biological opinion to describe and 
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Finally, the issuance criteria are very different, as ITPs may only issue if 
“[t]he applicant will, to the maximum extent practicable, minimize and miti-
gate the impacts of such takings,” and “[t]he taking will not appreciably reduce 
the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild” (i.e., the 
taking will not cause jeopardy to a listed species).168 In contrast, the much less 
stringent issuance criteria for scientific recovery permits merely requires that it 
is “likely to reduce the threat of extinction facing the species of wildlife sought 
to be covered by the permit,” and “the purpose for which the permit is required 
is adequate to justify removing from the wild or otherwise changing the status 
of the wildlife sought to be covered by the permit.”169 
During the Obama administration, these important permitting distinctions 
are starting to blur for the first time in the history of the Act’s implementation. 
Because the distinctions themselves lead to very different legal and practical 
consequences for permit applicants and the public, allowing these lines to blur 
can result in discord and confusion that undermines the purpose behind Con-
gress’ creation of the ITP process in the first instance and Secretary Babbitt’s 
innovative reforms designed to strengthen it. Although consistency may be 
“the last refuge for the unimaginative,”170 consistency is nevertheless vital to 
effectively implementing and enforcing federal laws.171 
III. BLURRED LINES: CONFLATING ITPS AND SCIENTIFIC  
RECOVERY PERMITS 
Although the incidental take permit (“ITP”) and habitat conservation plan 
(“HCP”) program is viewed by many as a resounding Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) success story, chinks in the program’s armor have started to show as a 
result of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) recent shift towards a more 
haphazard implementation of the ESA section 10 permitting programs for sci-
entific recovery permits and ITPs.172 Specifically, although the FWS’s section 
10 website still maintains the clear delineation between the two permitting 
                                                                                                                           
analyze the activities covered by the permit and to determine that the action would not jeopardize the 
continued existence of the species). 
 168 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22(b)(2)(i), 17.32(b)(2)(i) (2015). 
 169 Id. §§ 17.22(a)(2), 17.32(a)(2)(i). 
 170 Oscar Wilde, The Relation of Dress to Art, PALL MALL GAZETTE (London), Feb. 28, 1885, at 
4, reprinted in OSCAR WILDE, ARISTOTLE AT AFTERNOON TEA: THE RARE OSCAR WILDE 52 (John 
W. Jackson ed., 1991); see also RALPH WALDO EMERSON, Self-Reliance, in ESSAYS: FIRST SERIES 
(1841) (“A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philoso-
phers and divines.”). 
 171 Yoav Dotan, Making Consistency Consistent, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 995, 1000 (2005). 
 172 See infra notes 175–253 and accompanying text. 
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programs,173 and although the Obama administration continues to issue new 
ITPs and HCPs with regularity,174 the boundaries demarcating the two permit-
ting programs have started to blur for several controversial, yet politically ex-
pedient, projects that have flown under the radar despite producing insidious 
impacts on the efficacy of the section 10 process. 
A. Wind Energy Projects 
The primary area where the FWS has recently straddled the border be-
tween the two types of section 10 permits is in the development of renewable 
energy. It is not surprising that the Obama administration is conflicted when 
presented with questions surrounding renewable energy development when 
such projects will negatively affect listed wildlife species. Indeed, this admin-
istration has made it a top priority to permit as much renewable development 
as possible to achieve its stated climate goals.175 Hence, although the reason 
the administration would be looking for shortcuts to getting more renewable 
projects online is understandable, the ESA makes no exceptions for projects 
self-labeled as “green” projects.176 This means that a developer must comply 
with the proper section 10 mechanisms before proceeding with project con-
struction and-or operation that is likely to incidentally take a listed species.177 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Permits, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://www.fws.gov/ENDANGERED/permits/
index.html (last updated July. 15, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/Z72T-FXH8 (explaining that, 
“[i]ncidental take permits are required when non-[f]ederal activities will result in take of threatened or 
endangered species,” as compared to “[r]ecovery and interstate commerce permits[, which] are issued 
to allow for take as part of activities intended to foster the recovery of listed species . . . [such as] to 
allow for scientific research on a listed species in order to understand better the species’ long-term 
survival needs”). 
 174 See Conservation Plans and Agreements Database, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., http://ecos.
fws.gov/conserv_plans/public.jsp (last updated Mar. 31, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/445T-
EQYW (showing that as of April 1, 2015, the FWS has issued a total of 822 ITPs and approved 696 
HCPs since 1982) (note this this source updates daily and thus the numbers stated can be found in the 
archived link only). 
 175 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT’S CLIMATE ACTION PLAN 6–7 (2013), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimateactionplan.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/ZU6N-MCA9 (explaining that, “[d]uring the President’s first term, the 
United States more than doubled generation of electricity from wind, solar, and geothermal sources,” 
and advocating that, “[t]o ensure America’s continued leadership position in clean energy, President 
Obama has set a goal to double renewable electricity generation once again by 2020”). 
 176 See John C. Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 59, 96 (2013). 
 177 See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 581–83 (D. 
Md. 2009) (finding a wind energy developer in violation of ESA section 9). The court in Animal Wel-
fare Institute v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC concluded “that the only avenue available to Defendants to 
resolve the self-imposed plight in which they now find themselves is to do belatedly that which they 
should have done long ago: apply for an ITP.” Id. The court further explained that, “[t]he development 
of wind energy can and should be encouraged, but wind turbines must be good neighbors.” Id. See 
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1. The Fowler Ridge Wind Energy Facility 
A thorough review of the Federal Register shows that 2010 marked the 
first time that a developer applied for—and received—a section 10(a)(1)(A) 
scientific recovery permit for activities associated with profit-generating pri-
vate development, rather than for activities executed for the sole purpose of 
scientific research for species recovery.178 To be clear, before 2010, and since, 
the FWS issued many scientific recovery permits to developers or their con-
tractors—including in the renewable energy context—for the purpose of sur-
veying a potential project site for presence or absence of listed species and to 
help determine whether an ITP is necessary prior to project construction and 
operation, or similarly, to determine whether new circumstances or information 
require an ITP before further operation that threatens a listed species.179 What 
appeared in the Federal Register in 2010, however, is a far cry from survey 
activities during a time when a project is not in active operation.180 
On June 8, 2010, Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC applied for a section 
10(a)(1)(A) scientific recovery permit from the FWS for the purported purpose 
of implementing a scientific study “to test raising cut-in speeds of turbines as a 
method for reducing Indiana bat fatality rates at the Fowler Ridge Wind-energy 
facility.”181 The company only applied for this scientific recovery permit after 
                                                                                                                           
generally Nagle, supra note 176 (discussing the holding of Animal Welfare Institute and analyzing 
“environmental law’s contrasting approaches to the green harms of green projects”). 
 178 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,503, 35,504 (Dep’t of 
Interior June 22, 2010) (notice and request for comments) (noting permit application number 
TE15075A requested by Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC). 
 179 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 74 Fed. Reg. 47,814, 47,815 (Fish 
& Wildlife Serv. Sept. 17, 2009) (notice and request for comments) (soliciting public comment on 
applications for section 10(a)(1)(A) permits, including an application by “ABR, Inc., Environmental 
Research & Services” for the purposes of “surveys to document species’ presence or absence in areas 
proposed for wind-energy development, studies to document habitat use, collection of echolocation 
data and hair/tissue sampling for scientific research,” which “are aimed at enhancement of the survival 
of the species in the wild”). 
 180 Compare id. (providing the proposed activities that included “surveys to document species’ 
presence or absence in areas proposed for wind energy development, studies to document habitat use, 
collection of echolocation data and hair/tissue sampling for scientific research”), with Endangered and 
Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,504 (noting that the study is intended to aid the 
applicant in avoiding a take and the level of impact of certain operating procedures when a take does 
occur). 
 181 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. at 35,504; LARRY FOLKS, 
FOWLER RIDGE WIND FARM LLC, TE15075A, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE: FEDERAL FISH 
AND WILDLIFE PERMIT APPLICATION FORM (2010) (on file with author). Fowler Ridge’s contractor 
stated: 
We are seeking authorization for incidental take of Indiana bats, as part of a study de-
signed to test the effectiveness of raising cut-in speeds to reduce overall bat fatality 
rates during the fall migration period, the results of which can then be used to evaluate 
the effectiveness of these operational alternations in reducing turbine-related Indiana 
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discovering the “fatality of an [endangered] Indiana bat . . . at the Fowler 
Ridge project during the [2009] fall migration period,” which “was likely a 
result of a collision with a wind turbine”—meaning the company had already 
killed an Indiana bat without an ITP in place, in violation of section 9 of the 
ESA.182 Thus, rather than immediately halting operation of the energy facility 
until an ITP could be obtained, as is ordinarily required if take occurs without 
lawful authorization in place, Fowler Ridge sought FWS authorization to con-
tinue operating its profit-generating project in the absence of an ITP—
including by obtaining authorization to kill six more Indiana bats without pen-
alty—under the guise of conducting scientific research.183 Importantly, howev-
er, that scientific research was not scientific research aimed at recovering the 
Indiana bat.184 Instead, it was scientific research that, at best, would be used by 
the company to support its own subsequent ITP application to the FWS.185 
On June 22, 2010, the FWS issued a generic notice in the Federal Regis-
ter “invit[ing] public comment on [several] permit applications for certain ac-
tivities with endangered species authorized by section 10(a)(1)(A) of the Act” 
(i.e., scientific recovery permit applications).186 For these permit applications, 
the FWS only provided a thirty-day comment period and determined that, “the 
proposed activities in these permits are categorically excluded from the re-
quirement to prepare an environmental assessment or environmental impact 
statement.”187 The notice identified five scientific recovery permit applica-
tions.188 The first four applications concerned traditional activities for which 
scientific recovery permits are routinely granted.189 The fifth application stated 
that it was from Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC, that, “[t]he applicant requests 
a permit to take (migrating) Indiana bats within Benton County, Indiana, at the 
Fowler Ridge wind facility,” and that, “[t]he salvage study is designed to in-
                                                                                                                           
bat casualties . . . . to better understand the risk to Indiana bats during the migratory pe-
riod and to more accurately estimate fatality rates. 
RHETT E. GOOD ET AL., WEST INC., BAT MONITORING PROTOCOL: FOWLER RIDGE WIND-ENERGY 
FACILITY PHASES I, II AND III, BENTON COUNTY INDIANA 18 (2010) (emphasis added) (on file with 
author) (submitted as part of Fowler Ridge Wind Farm LLC’s permit application). 
 182 FOLKS, supra note 181, at (C)(1)(b), (e)(v). 
 183 See id. 
 184 GOOD ET AL., supra note 181, at 1. 
 185 Id. (noting that, “the owners of the Fowler Ridge Wind Farm requested that WEST conduct 
further research of Indiana bat use and potential casualty rates at [Fowler Ridge] for use in completing 
a HCP and obtaining an Incidental Take Permit (ITP) from Region 3 of the USFWS”). 
 186 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,503, 35,503 ( Fish & Wild-
life Serv. June 22, 2010) (notice and request for comments). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. at 35,503–04 (listing permit application requests). 
 189 These were capture and release activities, radio-tagging activities, and surveying activities to 
determine presence or absence of species. Id. 
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form the applicant as to the operating parameters that avoid take of bats and, 
where impacts occur, the level of impacts at various wind speeds and operating 
parameters.”190 The Federal Register notice failed to point out that the Fowler 
Ridge application concerned an operating project that had already resulted in 
the unauthorized lethal incidental take of an Indiana bat, or that the applicant 
sought FWS authorization for additional lethal incidental take while continuing 
to operate its project in a high-risk location for Indiana bats without an ITP in 
hand.191 
Although the FWS issued a cryptic Federal Register notice that likely 
made it difficult for members of the public to grasp the legal and practical con-
sequences of the Fowler Ridge scientific recovery permit application, the un-
precedented application caught the eye of two conservation organizations: De-
fenders of Wildlife and the Animal Welfare Institute. The organizations jointly 
submitted comments condemning the application and urging the FWS to deny 
it.192 The commenters raised myriad concerns with the application, including, 
inter alia: 
• Fowler Ridge’s application conflates the two distinct section 10 permit 
schemes created by Congress;193 
• Fowler Ridge’s application cannot logically be processed under section 
10(a)(1)(A) because it seeks merely to collect data to support the compa-
ny’s own subsequent ITP;194 
                                                                                                                           
 190 Id. at 35,504 (listing permit application number TE15075A by Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, 
LLC). 
 191 See id. 
 192 Letter from William S. Eubanks II & Eric R. Glitzenstein, Counsel to the Animal Welfare Inst. 
& Defenders of Wildlife, to Peter Fasbender, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (July 21, 2010) 
(on file with author) (the subject line of the letter reads, “Public Comments on Permit Application 
Number TE15075A (Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC)”). 
 193 Id. at 3. In explaining the distinguishing features of each permit, the commenters explain that, 
Because of the very different nature of the activities permitted by each mechanism 
(pure scientific research vs. private landowner development resulting in incidental 
take), Congress created many safeguards with respect to ITPs that are not required for 
[scientific recovery] permits . . . . [T]he proper permit mechanism for a particular ac-
tivity depends on the nature of the activity. Where the activity is intended solely to ad-
vance the existing body of science and to benefit a listed species by enhancing its sur-
vival and recovery efforts, an enhancement permit is sensible and a quicker federal re-
view is appropriate. However, in circumstances involving private landowners and activ-
ities that are likely to result in incidental takes of listed species, the only legally permis-
sible mechanism is an ITP—and only if each of the defined criteria are satisfied . . . . 
Id. 
 194 Id. at 4 & n.3 The commenters further explain that, 
[T]esting cut-in speeds mostly to support its own ITP application cannot, by itself, sup-
port an “enhancement” permit . . . . [because] it would be a legal and logical oxymoron 
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• Fowler Ridge’s application is problematic because it eliminates the more 
stringent ITP issuance standards and excludes this activity from NEPA 
review;195 
• Fowler Ridge’s application fails to recognize that many similarly situated 
wind energy facilities had appropriately sought an ITP, rather than a sci-
entific recovery permit for identical activities;196 and 
• Fowler Ridge’s application failed to demonstrate that there was a credible 
need for the stated research activities to contribute to the existing body of 
science, nor were there sufficient peer review safeguards in place to en-
sure that such research would be methodologically defensible.197 
Although the commenters urged that the FWS deny the permit application for 
these various reasons, they nevertheless offered suggestions—based on cut-
ting-edge scientific research—of how the developer could lawfully proceed 
with at least some energy generation (and thus obtain some profits) without 
resulting in any unauthorized take of Indiana bats while waiting for an ITP.198 
Further, the commenters encouraged the developer to incorporate the scientific 
research underlying the recovery permit application into the HCP that would 
accompany the developer’s ITP application at the appropriate juncture, be-
cause doing so would allow the FWS and the public to consider the wisdom of 
that particular scientific methodology in the proper context of an ITP aimed at 
minimizing and mitigating take of Indiana bats at this particular project site.199 
Despite the critical comments received on Fowler Ridge’s permit applica-
tion, the FWS made its required ESA findings on July 30, 2010 concerning 
permit issuance, which recommended on the basis of those findings that the 
FWS issue the scientific recovery permit to the company.200 Anomalously, the 
                                                                                                                           
for a private company seeking to take a listed species to say that it is “enhancing” the 
survival and recovery of the species merely by obtaining the data necessary to support 
its own ITP. . . . Indeed, if such a rationale was acceptable here, then any private activi-
ty impacting a species—be it a logging operation, mining project, or subdivision—
could be justified on “enhancement” grounds, i.e., that the project proponent’s partial 
implementation of the project is necessary to obtain data that will support an ITP. 
Id. 
 195 Id. at 6 n.5 (reasoning that an enhancement permit should not be granted because it circum-
vents the requirements of NEPA and avoids “other federal and public review processes”), 8 (explain-
ing that an enhancement permit here avoids the notice and comment requirements of ITPs as well as 
federal review under section 10 of the ESA). 
 196 Id. at 6–7. 
 197 Id. at 7. 
 198 Id. at 9–10. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Memorandum from Peter Fasbender, Endangered Species Permits Biologist, U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Serv., to Chief of Endangered Species, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. (July 30, 2010) (on file 
with author). 
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FWS based its findings on the fact that, in the FWS’s view, “[t]he research at 
Fowler Ridge will provide information that can be applied to wind farms 
throughout the range of the Indiana bat” and that, “[w]ithout this permit, the 
research will not be conducted.”201 This was misleading, however, because not 
only had the commenters explained to the FWS that similar scientific research 
was already ongoing in various places throughout the Indiana bat’s range, but 
they had also made clear that this same research can—and should—be a cen-
terpiece of the company’s ITP and HCP.202 As such, the research would, in 
fact, be conducted irrespective of whether the FWS issued the scientific recov-
ery permit.203 Two days later, the FWS issued a section 10(a)(1)(A) scientific 
recovery permit to Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC authorizing lethal take of 
up to six Indiana bats resulting from turbine collision during the period of time 
that the company’s contractor would be conducting some scientific research to 
support the developer’s ITP application.204 
During the research period authorized under the scientific recovery per-
mit, Fowler Ridge’s contractor discovered yet another Indiana bat that had 
been killed by the facility’s wind turbines—i.e., a predictable result of contin-
ued operation of a high-risk project without an ITP in place delineating specif-
ic terms and conditions aimed at minimizing and mitigating incidental takes of 
Indiana bats.205 Had the FWS denied Fowler Ridge’s recovery permit applica-
tion and instead required the company to cease further operation until an ITP 
could be obtained (or at least agree to operational constraints that would elimi-
nate any risk of Indiana bat fatalities)—as this author argues is the only out-
come consistent with section 10 of the ESA—this new endangered bat fatality 
in the absence of an ITP could not have occurred. Instead, rather than penaliz-
ing Fowler Ridge for killing multiple Indiana bats without an operative ITP in 
place as required by section 10, the FWS specifically allowed the “research” to 
continue by renewing the permit multiple times, thereby extending its duration 
to far longer than originally disclosed to the public in the initial permit applica-
tion.206 As expected, at the end of the research period, the developer sought a 
                                                                                                                           
 201 Id. at 2. 
 202 Letter from William S. Eubanks II & Eric R. Glitzenstein, Counsel to the Animal Welfare Inst. 
& Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 192, at 7–9. 
 203 Id. at 7–10. 
 204 U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., NO. TE15075A-0, FEDERAL FISH AND WILDLIFE PERMIT, PER-
MITTEE: FOWLER RIDGE WIND FARM (2010) (on file with author). 
 205 See Amanda Solliday, Wind Farm Offers Plan to Protect Endangered Indiana Bat, IND. PUB. 
MEDIA (May 16, 2013), http://indianapublicmedia.org/news/wind-farm-offers-plan-protect-endangered-
bat-49373/, archived at http://perma.cc/2PJF-SG9U. 
 206 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,173, 76,174 (Dec. 16, 
2013) (notice of availability of permit applications; request for comments) (noting permit application 
number TE73598A requested by Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, LLC); Endangered and Threatened Spe-
cies, 78 Fed. Reg. 9415, 9416 (Feb. 8, 2013) (notice of issuance of permits); Endangered and Threat-
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section 10(a)(1)(B) ITP to cover incidental take for the remainder of the pro-
ject’s lifespan.207 Because the FWS was, at last, reviewing an ITP application, 
there was a much more transparent process—including two public comment 
opportunities totaling ninety days—as well as a full-blown environmental im-
pact statement (“EIS”) analyzing the entire array of environmental impacts 
resulting from issuance of an ITP.208 
Although it is commendable that the developer finally sought and ob-
tained an ITP for what is plainly a high-risk project in light of the two con-
firmed Indiana bat mortalities, the plain language of the ESA does not support 
the spurious use of a scientific recovery permit to allow the private developer 
to operate this project for over four years without crucial HCP-backed mortali-
ty minimization measures.209 It is particularly troubling that the FWS approved 
this unprecedented course of action for a developer in an industry that is highly 
prioritized by the current administration.210 As the commenters to the Fowler 
Ridge recovery permit application explained, this legally tenuous approach 
could lead to absurd results because, “if such a rationale was acceptable here, 
then any private activity impacting a species—be it a logging operation, min-
ing project, or subdivision—could be justified on ‘enhancement’ grounds, i.e., 
that the project proponent’s partial implementation of the project is necessary 
to obtain data that will support an ITP.”211 Such an outcome would turn ESA 
section 10 on its head, and ignore the legislative history of the Act, which em-
phasizes the critical distinctions between the two permitting mechanisms.212 
2. The Bishop Hill Wind Energy Facility and the California Ridge Wind 
Energy Facility 
After setting the precedent by issuing the Fowler Ridge scientific permit, 
which approved wind energy generation in high-risk Indiana bat habitat so 
long as there is some purported scientific research that can be conducted dur-
                                                                                                                           
ened Wildlife and Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. 29,357, 29,358 (May 17, 2012) (notice of permit applications; 
request for comments) (noting permit application number TE73598A requested by Fowler Ridge 
Wind Farm, LLC); Endangered and Threatened Species, 76 Fed. Reg. 74,070, 74,740 (Nov. 30, 2011) 
(notice of issuance of permits). 
 207 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Draft Environmental Impact Statement for a Proposed Habitat 
Conservation Plan and Incidental Take Permit, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,384 (May 25, 2011). 
 208 See Final Environmental Impact Statement, Fowler Ridge Wind Farm, Benton County, Indi-
ana, 79 Fed. Reg. 3224 (Jan 17, 2014); Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Fowler Ridge Wind 
Farm, Benton County, Indiana, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,690 (Apr. 5, 2013). 
 209 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012). 
 210 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at 1-5. 
 211 Letter from William S. Eubanks II & Eric R. Glitzenstein, Counsel to the Animal Welfare Inst. 
& Defenders of Wildlife, supra note 192, at 4 n.3. 
 212 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1539(a)(1)(A)–(B). 
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ing the course of project operation,213 other wind companies came knocking on 
the FWS’s door seeking similar treatment.214 
First, the FWS announced in April 2012 that Bishop Hill Energy LLC was 
seeking lethal take authorization for up to two Indiana bats as a result of its 
normal project operations, during which time the developer would implement a 
“research proposal . . . . [that] would evaluate bat mortality and take avoidance 
at the facility to benefit listed and unlisted bat species,” and which sought to 
“devise biologically based operational protocols for turbines at the Henry 
County facility to successfully avoid take of listed bat species” (i.e., the activi-
ties ordinarily devised in, and researched under, an ITP-HCP).215 In contrast to 
the Fowler Ridge situation, the FWS at least purported to conduct NEPA re-
view related to permit issuance, although the self-interested developer drafted 
the cursory twenty-six-page EA, rather than the FWS.216 As was the case with 
Fowler Ridge, the FWS only provided a thirty-day public comment period.217 
In line with the precedent set at Fowler Ridge, the FWS ultimately issued a 
scientific recovery permit to Bishop Hill.218 
Next, in April 2013, the FWS notified the public that California Ridge 
Wind Energy LLC was seeking a scientific recovery permit for “a two year 
scientific research study of acoustic deterrents, wind turbine operational exper-
iments, and fatality surveys at the California Ridge Wind Energy Project,” 
programs purportedly “aimed at conservation of the species through reduction 
of impacts at wind energy facilities”—activities that, once again, ordinarily 
require incidental take authorization pursuant to an ITP before any additional 
activities may proceed that are likely to take listed species.219 Yet again, the 
FWS only provided a thirty-day public comment period for this application, 
and again deferred to the developer by letting the company prepare the cursory 
EA that was only available for public review upon request.220 Commenters 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See supra notes 178–212 and accompanying text. 
 214 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,769 (Apr. 
26, 2013) (noting permit application number TE03502B requested by California Ridge Wind Energy, 
LLC); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,273, 23,273–74 (Apr. 18, 
2012) (noting permit application number TE71464A requested by Bishop Hill Energy, LLC). 
 215 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. at 23,273–74. 
 216 Id. at 23,274; see also BISHOP HILL ENERGY LLC, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: 
SECTION 10(A)(1)(A) RECOVERY PERMIT APPLICATION, BISHOP HILL WIND ENERGY PROJECT, HEN-
RY COUNTY, ILLINOIS (2012) (on file with author) (indicating that the EA was prepared by Bishop 
Hill Energy LLC, the developer for this project). 
 217 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. at 23,273. 
 218 Endangered and Threatened Species, 78 Fed. Reg. 9415, 9416 (Feb. 8, 2013) (notice of issu-
ance of permits) (granting permit to Fowler Ridge Wind Farm); Endangered and Threatened Species, 
79 Fed. Reg. 8473, 8474 (Feb. 12, 2014) (notice of issuance of permits). 
 219 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. at 24,769. 
 220 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,768 (Apr. 26, 2013); 
see also CAL. RIDGE WIND ENERGY LLC, DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: SECTION 
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raised serious concerns with the FWS’s continued illegal conflation of the pur-
poses underlying ITPs and scientific recovery permits, as well as the lack of 
compliance with section 10 of the ESA, NEPA, and general notice-and-
comment procedures.221 Notwithstanding those concerns, the FWS granted the 
developer a scientific recovery permit allowing it to operate its turbines in the 
absence of an ITP through the end of 2015.222 
Considering that the FWS has now issued scientific recovery permits to 
three different wind energy facilities in less than four years, even though those 
developers all genuinely seek incidental take authorization through an ITP-
HCP, it does not seem likely that the FWS will be reversing its trend anytime 
soon.223 This is particularly unlikely during an administration that, at least 
through its actions, appears to support renewable energy above imperiled spe-
cies.224 If the FWS, however, were to simply return to implementing the sec-
tion 10 permitting scheme as Congress intended, while refusing to grant con-
venient administrative shortcuts to wind energy developers, a lawful, yet envi-
ronmentally protective equilibrium, could be restored between these two im-
portant national policies.225 
In Animal Welfare Institute v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, a federal judge 
summarized this need perfectly in finding that a wind energy project was in 
violation of the ESA and had to obtain an ITP: 
[T]his is a case about bats, wind turbines, and two federal policies, 
one favoring the protection of endangered species, and the other en-
couraging development of renewable energy resources. Congress, in 
enacting the ESA, has unequivocally stated that endangered species 
must be afforded the highest priority, and the FWS long ago desig-
nated the Indiana bat as an endangered species. By the same token, 
Congress has strongly encouraged the development of clean, renew-
                                                                                                                           
10(A)(1)(A) INDIANA BAT (MYOTIS SODALIS) ENHANCEMENT OF SURVIVAL PERMIT APPLICATION, 
CALIFORNIA RIDGE I WIND ENERGY PROJECT, VERMILION AND CHAMPAIGN COUNTIES, ILLINOIS 
(2013) (on file with author) (indicating that the EA was prepared by California Ridge Wind Energy 
LLC, the developer for this project). 
 221 See, e.g., Letter from William S. Eubanks II & Eric R. Glitzenstein, Counsel for Friends of 
Blackwater, to Lisa Mandell, Reg’l Dir., U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv. Ecological Servs. (May 28, 2013) 
(on file with author) (stating in subject line, “Comments on Permit Application Number TE03502B 
(California Ridge Wind Energy LLC)”). 
 222 Endangered and Threatened Species, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8474 (renewing permit). 
 223 See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,769 (Apr. 26, 
2013); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 77 Fed. Reg. 23,273, 23,273–74 (Apr. 18, 
2012); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Permit Applications, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,503, 
35,504 (Dep’t of Interior June 22, 2010) (notices). 
 224 See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 175, at 6–7. 
 225 See Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 581(D. Md. 
2009). 
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able energy, including wind energy. It is uncontroverted that wind 
turbines kill or injure bats in large numbers, and the Court has con-
cluded, in this case, that there is a virtual certainty that construction 
and operation of the Beech Ridge Project will take endangered Indi-
ana bats in violation of Section 9 of the ESA. The two vital federal 
policies at issue in this case are not necessarily in conflict. Indeed, 
the tragedy of this case is that Defendants . . . failed to take ad-
vantage of a specific mechanism, the ITP process, established by 
federal law to allow their project to proceed in harmony with the 
goal of avoidance of harm to endangered species.226 
For these reasons, wind energy developers seeking to operate profit-
generating turbines on private land that are likely to kill or otherwise take fed-
erally protected species must obtain an ITP prior to project operation or imme-
diately upon learning of the project’s risk to imperiled species.227 They should 
not, instead, operate their turbines in a manner that will take endangered or 
threatened species until and unless the FWS issues an ITP and approves an 
HCP.228 In implementing that ITP-HCP, a wind energy developer would likely 
undertake various scientific monitoring and survey measures identified in the 
HCP, several of which may very well contribute to the body of existing science 
concerning the effects of wind energy on birds, bats, and other listed spe-
cies.229 This is the precise purpose for which Congress designed the section 10 
ITP-HCP process.230 Adhering to Congress’ design is the logical way to restore 
harmony between the “two vital federal” policies that “are not necessarily in 
conflict”: renewable energy generation and wildlife conservation.231 
B. Keystone XL Pipeline 
The only other instance in which the FWS has erroneously issued a scien-
tific permit for activities requiring an ITP provides a glimmer of hope that this 
practice will eventually disappear as a matter of agency policy. That instance 
involved a permit related to development of another energy project: the con-
troversial Keystone XL Pipeline.232 The FWS, faced with litigation in that 
                                                                                                                           
 226 Id. (emphasis added) (noting, however, that Beech Ridge had ignored the “repeated advice” of 
FWS). 
 227 See id. 
 228 See id. 
 229 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,768, 24,769 (Apr. 
26, 2013). 
 230 See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., supra note 90, at 1-5. 
 231 See Animal Welfare Inst., 675 F. Supp. 2d at 581. 
 232 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. 
Dep’t of State, 2011 WL 5909488 (D. Neb. 2011) (No. 8:11-cv-00345), 2011 WL 4580585; Receipt 
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case, backed off of its stance that a scientific recovery permit can lawfully 
cover incidental take (and substitute for an ITP).233 
The U.S. Department of State announced in 2008 that TransCanada Key-
stone Pipeline, LP “ha[d] applied . . . for a Presidential Permit for the proposed 
construction, connection, operation, and maintenance of a pipeline and associ-
ated facilities at the United States border for importation of crude oil from 
Canada.”234 A potential hiccup for TransCanada, however, was the fact that 
pipeline would have to be built directly through the range of the endangered 
American burying beetle in Nebraska, meaning the beetles would almost cer-
tainly be taken incidental to TransCanada’s pipeline-related activities.235 Ra-
ther than itself seeking an ITP to move beetles out of harm’s way prior to pipe-
line construction or to harm beetles during construction and operation, Trans-
Canada hired Dr. Wyatt Hoback—an entomologist at the University of Ne-
braska Kearney—to relocate the beetles under an existing recovery permit al-
lowing Dr. Hoback to carry out certain scientific research activities with re-
spect to beetles.236 
Starting in 2001, the FWS issued Dr. Hoback a scientific recovery permit 
“in conjunction with recovery activities throughout the species’ range for the 
purpose of enhancing its survival and recovery.”237 After being retained by 
TransCanada—many years later—to capture American burying beetles in the 
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construction path of the Keystone XL Pipeline in order to relocate them, Dr. 
Hoback sought to renew his permit from FWS. In notifying the public about 
Dr. Hoback’s request to renew his recovery permit, the FWS issued a cryptic 
Federal Register notice in which the agency did little to inform the public 
about the full extent of the activities for which Dr. Hoback sought recovery 
permit renewal.238 The notice stated that, “[t]he applicant requests a renewed 
permit to take American burying beetle in conjunction with recovery activities 
throughout the species’ range for the purpose of enhancing its survival and re-
covery.”239 Perhaps not realizing the legal implications, local newspapers 
broke the story in late 2011 that TransCanada was spending hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars on Dr. Hoback and his team of graduate students in order to 
survey, capture, and relocate beetles out of the pipeline’s path under the author-
ity of Dr. Hoback’s scientific recovery permit.240 The purpose of these activi-
ties, however, was plainly not to conduct scientific research aimed at species 
recovery but rather to minimize incidental take associated with construction 
and operation of a privately developed pipeline (i.e., exactly the type of activi-
ty for which an ITP is required).241 
In Center of Biological Diversity v. U.S. Department of State, three con-
servation organizations filed suit against the FWS and other federal agencies in 
connection with the FWS’s authorization of incidental take to Dr. Hoback 
through a scientific recovery permit, instead of an ITP.242 The plaintiffs assert-
ed that, “[t]he authorization of take incidental to the Keystone XL Pipeline is 
beyond the statutory authority conferred by and in direct violation of Section 
10(a)(1)(A) of the ESA.”243 In support of their claim, the plaintiffs explained 
that, “[b]y the plain language of [s]ection 10(a)(1)(A), a research permit can 
only permit take that occurs in connection with scientific research or enhance-
ment, and cannot authorize take of endangered species when that take is inci-
dental to an agency action such as the Keystone XL Pipeline.”244 As such, the 
plaintiffs argued, “FWS’s issuance of the research permit was arbitrary, capri-
cious, an abuse of discretion, [and] not in accordance with the ESA . . . .”245 
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Recognizing that the ESA’s plain language would almost certainly prevail 
if the case reached the merits, the FWS abandoned its previous approval of 
incidental take via a scientific recovery permit when Dr. Hoback next request-
ed renewal of his recovery permit in 2012.246 Specifically, the FWS renewed 
Dr. Hoback’s scientific recovery permit insofar as the FWS expressly deter-
mined that such activities—“trapping and handling” of beetles “to assess their 
range, distribution, numbers, and habitat conditions”—were “consistent with 
the recovery of the burying beetle.”247 The FWS, however, denied the remain-
der of the permit, which sought coverage for incidental take associated with 
the Keystone XL Pipeline.248  
 Based on this finding, the FWS issued Dr. Hoback a scientific recovery 
permit for the limited purposes of surveying and scientific research efforts 
aimed at genuine species recovery.249 It reiterated in the terms and conditions 
of the permit itself that the permit “does not apply to capture and relocation of 
American burying beetles for removal from harm’s way related to project-
related impacts” because incidental take of that kind must “be covered through 
another mechanism, such as an incidental take statement in a biological opin-
ion pursuant to section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species Act or an incidental 
take permit pursuant to section 10(a)(l)(B) of the Act.”250 Indeed, as a result of 
the FWS’s hard line on section 10 in this context, the developer is now seeking 
an ITP for an incidental take of American burying beetles in connection with 
construction and operation of the pipeline.251 
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In this instance, it took litigation to bring about the FWS’s clear statement 
of agency policy concerning the proper application of section 10 vis-à-vis ac-
tivities resulting in incidental take associated with a private development pro-
ject—irrespective of whether those activities contain a scientific component.252 
Nevertheless, the Keystone XL Pipeline case study supports the possibility that 
the FWS could permanently halt its arbitrary issuance of scientific recovery 
permits to inapt developers seeking shortcuts to avoid operational shutdowns, 
constraints, or delays due to the existing or newly discovered likelihood of in-
cidental take.253 
IV. FOSTERING POOR PUBLIC POLICY: WHY THE FWS MUST ABANDON ITS 
ARBITRARY APPLICATION OF SECTION 10 AND RETURN TO  
THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
As seen in the examples described above, granting a scientific recovery 
permit to a preferentially treated industry is tantamount to providing that in-
dustry with what amounts to a regulatory subsidy.254 The U.S. Fish and Wild-
life Service’s (“FWS”) actions helped developers implement a stopgap meas-
ure when listed species issues arose, to ensure continued operation—and thus 
continued profits—until an incidental take permit (“ITP”) could be properly 
secured to address the threats the project posed to those species.255 Although 
this exercise in political expediency may not ruffle many feathers in the envi-
ronmental community when it is applied to the renewable energy industry, a 
sector aimed in part at ameliorating the adverse effects of climate change, ce-
menting this counter-textual precedent now will facilitate less palatable appli-
cations in the future. Such a precedent would give future administrations am-
munition to confer similar regulatory subsidies, through scientific recovery 
permits, to the oil and gas industry, commercial and residential construction 
companies, and other private developers for whom the ITP was specifically 
designed. 
By blurring the lines between the two distinct Endangered Species Act 
(“ESA”) section 10 programs, the FWS’s recent practice has removed the ob-
jectivity and fairness inherent in the carefully calibrated scheme Congress cre-
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ated.256 In the place of that objectivity and fairness, the FWS has made the ap-
plicability of section 10 permits subject to the whims, campaign contribution-
fueled priorities, and other subjective factors, of the current administration.257 
In essence, this result-oriented approach of issuing scientific recovery permits 
to certain industries, while refusing to issue similar permits to other industries 
in functionally identical factual circumstances, constitutes the height of arbi-
trary and capricious decision-making.258  
In addition to these practical considerations, there are strong legal conse-
quences that flow from the FWS’s arbitrary conferral of scientific recovery 
permits for certain industries where incidental take is at issue. First, the FWS’s 
Federal Register notices concerning scientific recovery permits are far less de-
scriptive than the notices for ITPs, and thus the conflation of these two distinct 
permitting systems subverts the information disclosure that would otherwise 
occur if an entity sought an ITP.259 Second, the public comment period is ordi-
narily a minimum of sixty days for ITPs, as compared to only thirty days for 
scientific recovery permits, meaning the FWS’s blurring of the lines results in 
a severely truncated opportunity for meaningful public review.260 Third, 
whereas an ITP will almost certainly lead to an environmental impact state-
ment (“EIS”) or at minimum a detailed Environmental Assessment (“EA”),261 
a scientific recovery permit allows the applicant to skirt National Environmen-
tal Policy Act (“NEPA”) by finding safe harbor under a categorical exclusion, 
or, at most, by allowing the applicant itself to develop a cursory EA.262 
Fourth, instead of triggering the FWS’s own section 7 duty to self-consult 
over permit issuance and to prepare a site-specific biological opinion as is re-
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quired for an ITP,263 electing to issue a scientific recovery permit instead ordi-
narily bypasses this step because such permits are generally covered by a pro-
grammatic biological opinion spanning many recovery permits, which does not 
take into account the site-specific impacts of any one permit.264 Fifth, because 
an ITP necessarily requires more stringent issuance criteria due to the fact that 
purely scientific research efforts aimed at species recovery are granted more 
leniency than incidental take associated with private development,265 the 
FWS’s issuance of a recovery permit where an ITP is appropriate vitiates the 
importance of the statutorily required issuance criteria, and of the findings that 
must be made before an ITP can be issued, such as the jeopardy backstop.266 
For all of the aforementioned reasons, and in order to fully effectuate each 
distinct provision of section 10 of the ESA—thereby ensuring that the scien-
tific recovery permit provision does not, in any instance, render the ITP provi-
sion superfluous—the FWS should follow its own example from the Keystone 
XL Pipeline.267 Specifically, the FWS should formally determine, as a matter 
of agency-wide policy, that incidental take associated with private develop-
ment activities requires an ITP, regardless of whether the developer is willing 
to commit to some scientific surveys or mitigation measures as part of its plan 
to construct and operate the project consistent with the ESA.268 Further, the 
agency should also ensure that in such instances, developers will refrain from 
incidental take unless and until an ITP is secured.269 
CONCLUSION 
Congress implemented an ambitious objective when, pursuant to the En-
dangered Species Act (“ESA”), it created the incidental take permit and habitat 
conservation plan (“ITP-HCP”) section 10 permitting process in 1982, to ac-
commodate non-federal development projects that will result in incidental 
takes of listed species that would otherwise be prohibited  by section 9 of the 
Act. In so doing, Congress created a means by which non-federal development 
could co-exist with wildlife and habitat protection, and which might even re-
sult in net benefits to at-risk species. In conjunction with that objective, Con-
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gress was seeking collaborative partnerships with landowners and developers, 
and agency reforms in the 1990s helped that program realize its full potential. 
The Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) recent penchant, however, for mud-
dying the waters in delineating what activities qualify for scientific recovery 
permits, in contrast to those that qualify for ITPs, has set in motion a danger-
ous and potentially environmentally harmful precedent that will be difficult to 
stop if it continues to gain momentum. 
Accordingly, this Article calls for the FWS to immediately halt its recent 
practice of granting scientific recovery permits for incidental takes associated 
with private development projects. It is particularly crucial that the FWS cease 
this practice where the purpose of the authorization is to allow a developer to 
operate, or to continue operating, a profit-generating project at the expense of 
listed species and in the absence of an ITP-HCP. The ITP-HCP permitting pro-
gram has a foundation of species-protective terms and conditions that have 
been fully vetted by the FWS and the public through the process embodied in 
section 10(a)(1)(B) of the ESA. This process is vital to ensuring the integrity 
of the permitting process and to effectuating the overall purposes behind the 
ESA, and thus it is imperative that it be implemented as Congress saw fit. At 
minimum, if a developer can set forth genuine empirical research that will con-
tribute to the existing body of science, this Article argues that the FWS should 
follow its own handbook, which instructs that in such instances, the developer 
would need to satisfy the issuance criteria for both an ITP and a scientific re-
covery permit, before undertaking any project-related activities that are likely 
to incidentally take listed species. By taking a hard stance and refusing to 
bootstrap any future incidental take authorizations through the scientific recov-
ery permit process, the FWS would return to the impartial science-based ap-
proach that Congress established in the ESA—a statute explicitly “intended to 
ensure objective, value-neutral decision making by specially trained ex-
perts.”270
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